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Abstract 
All the concepts and principles necessary to understand quantum mechanics on 
an initial level are given in a form suitable for the non-expert.  The concepts 
explained include visualizing the wave function, wave-particle duality, the 
implications of Schrödinger’s cat, probability, the uncertainty principle, 
collapse of the wave function, and others.  However, because of the peculiar, 
non-intuitive nature of quantum mechanics, one must understand the potential 
interpretations of its mathematics before one can properly understand these 
concepts.  Thus the paper is organized around interpretations, conceptual 
pictures that explain the peculiar properties of the theory.  The only 
interpretation that currently satisfies all the constraints imposed by experiments 
and the theory itself makes use of a perceiving Mind which is outside the laws 
of quantum mechanics. 
 
 
Introduction. 
 Quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory which accurately 
describes physical reality in a wide range of situations.  Its use of the non-intuitive 
wave function, however, means that the true nature of the physical reality described 
is far from clear.  Because of this, many different interpretations—conceptual 
pictures of the nature of the underlying reality—have been proposed.  There are 
three major interpretations and perhaps a dozen others, so one sometimes gets the 
impression that it is not possible to gain a proper understanding of what underlies 
the theory. 
 The situation, however, is not as chaotic as it appears.  The reason there are 
so many interpretations is that their originators were apparently not aware of all the 
relevant properties of the theory itself.  So what we do here is list and justify all the 
properties of quantum mechanics relevant to its interpretation.  This approach 
brings order to the interpretive problem and significantly narrows down the set of 
possible interpretations. 
 
 History. To understand how a successful theory could require an 
interpretation, we need to briefly review the history of physics.  Classical 
mechanics, discovered almost entirely by Newton around 1700, was a very 
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successful mathematical scheme for predicting the paths of the atoms that matter 
was presumably made of.  Since it involved the flight of easily visualized particles 
through our familiar three-dimensional space, classical physics gave a picture of 
reality which was compatible with our conventional, everyday view of the world.  
Quantum mechanics, however, is a different story.  It was discovered in the search 
for a mathematical scheme which would explain classically unsolvable problems 
such as the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation given off by a hot object, the 
photoelectric effect, and especially why the hydrogen atom radiates certain colors 
of light.  Rather than being the brainchild of a single person, however, there were at 
least half a dozen major physicists who, over a period of 25 years, each discovered 
an essential piece of the puzzle.  And with each piece, the mathematics moved 
farther away from our everyday view of the world.   
The end result of these separate insights—the equation discovered by 
Schrödinger in 1926—was a scheme which is highly successful.  In addition to the 
hydrogen atom spectrum, quantum mechanics describes a great many 
phenomena—all the properties of atoms and nuclei, semiconductors, lasers, the 
systematics of elementary particles—and it has never given a result in conflict with 
experiment.  But its mathematics involves the mysterious wave function rather than 
the easily-visualized particles, so it no longer has a clear correspondence with our 
commonplace view of reality.  Because of this, one needs an interpretation of the 
mathematics to understand how it relates to our perceived physical world. 
 
 Peculiarities of Quantum Mechanics.  Quantum mechanics is difficult to 
understand because it has two peculiar properties.  The first, illustrated by the 
Schrödinger’s cat experiment in the next section, is that the wave function contains 
several simultaneously existing versions of reality—the cat is both alive and dead at 
the same time.  We perceive only one of those possible versions of reality.  But 
quantum mechanics treats all versions equally, so it does not tell us why we 
perceive a particular version.   
 The fact that there are several versions of reality leads to the second 
peculiar property, probability.  Through an empirically verified law which currently 
appears to be separate from the rest of the mathematics, quantum mechanics tells 
us the probability of seeing a live cat or a dead cat.  There is currently no clear 
understanding of this ‘rolling-the-dice’ aspect of the theory.  (There is one other 
peculiar quantum mechanical property, non-locality—see appendix A6.  But, 
although it is of interest in its own right, non-locality is not a major factor in 
determining the correct interpretation.) 
 
 Major interpretations. There are three major interpretations which attempt 
to give an understanding of these properties.  The first is to suppose that, in 
addition to the many quantum versions of reality, there is an actual, objective 
reality made of particles, and it is the particles, rather than the wave functions, that 
we perceive.  A second potential way out of the multiple-versions-of-reality 
problem is to suppose the wave function ‘collapses’ down to just one version; the 
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dead cat wave function might collapse to zero, for example, leaving just a live cat 
(wave function) to be perceived.  And a third possible solution, the Everett many-
worlds interpretation, is to suppose all versions always exist, so there are many 
version of each of us!?  We will explain these in more detail and show that each—
including the existence of particles!—runs into severe difficulties.   
 
 Conclusion.  The implication of these results is that the theory of the 
physical universe, as it currently stands, is incomplete.  For if the probability law is 
to hold, there must be some ‘mechanism’ that singles out just one version as the 
one corresponding to our perceptions.  But there is no evidence for, and substantial 
evidence against, the conventionally proposed mechanisms—particles, hidden 
variables and collapse.  Thus the most likely candidate for the singling out 
mechanism at this time is a perceiving “Mind” not subject to the laws of quantum 
mechanics (in contrast to the physical brain, which is subject to those laws).  This 
has far-reaching consequences for how we view our world. 
 
 Mathematics and perceptions.  We perceive a world that has only a single 
version of reality and so we naturally assume that the ‘actual’ reality consists of 
only a single, ‘objective’ version of reality.  Further, because the classical physics 
of Newton worked so well, we tend to assume that the world is made up of 
particles.  But this ‘intuitively obvious’ scheme—a single-version reality made up 
of particles—is not our starting point.  What we are most certain of are (1) our 
perceptions and (2) the mathematics which describes what we perceive so well.  So, 
in the quest to deduce the true nature of the physical world from physics, we use 
the strategy of examining the connections between the mathematics of quantum 
mechanics and our perceptions.  In this way, we hope to eliminate any pre-
judgments on the nature of reality.  (See also the remark “Can we use physics…” in 
section 8.)  This approach, as we will see, leads us in unexpected directions. 
 
 Level and organization of the paper.  Interpretations.  We have taken 
care to make the paper understandable to the general reader.  Many of the 
mathematical justifications of the principles have been left out to make the general 
scheme easier to follow.  These can be found in the arXiv article [1], “Constraints 
on Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics”, at 
arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0912/0912.2985.pdf .   
 
 As we said in the abstract, it is not possible to adequately explain the basic 
ideas without a firm grasp of the interpretations of quantum mechanics.  Thus the 
paper is organized around interpretations.  Our treatment of them will appear to be 
unorthodox to some.  But to the best of my knowledge, all the relevant principles of 
quantum mechanics are taken into account here and/or in [1], in a carefully 
organized way, and that is not true of most other inquiries into interpretations. 
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1. Multiple Versions of Reality. 
Schrödinger’s Cat 
 
A. Visualizing the wave function.  The Schrödinger equation of quantum 
mechanics governs the motion of the wave functions, so it is (on the least abstract 
level) the wave functions which are the ‘physical objects’ in the mathematics of 
quantum mechanics; particles never enter the mathematics.  A useful visual picture 
of the wave function is that it is matter spread out in a mist or cloud of varying 
density.  The Schrödinger equation determines the shape and density of the cloud, 
and how it moves through space.  If there are several ‘particles’, the total wave 
function may be pictured as several separate (or sometimes overlapping) clouds, 
with the Schrödinger equation determining how the clouds interact.  The wave 
function of a macroscopic object like a cat or a human being, composed of billions 
of ‘single particle’ individual wave functions, is extremely complicated, but that 
does not prevent us from deducing certain relevant general characteristics. 
 
 B. Notation and terminology. We often have to refer to the ‘state’ of a 
particle or detector or observer—the location of a silver atom, a detector reading 
yes or no, an observer perceiving a live or dead cat.  We will sometimes use square 
brackets, [label], and sometimes the ‘ket’ notation label| , where the label 
describes the relevant property—the position of a silver atom and so on—of the 
wave function.   
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│Technically the ket refers to the abstract ‘state vector’.  But there is no 
│easy visualization of the state vector, so, since the wave function contains 
│all the necessary information, we will not use the term. 
 
 C. Many versions of reality.  The world around us certainly appears to be 
unique, the physical world, upon which we all agree.  But in quantum mechanics, 
the highly successful mathematical description of nature, there is no unique 
physical world; instead there are many simultaneously existing versions of physical 
reality.  We will give two examples here, nuclear decay and Schrödinger’s cat.  
Two other examples of simultaneously existing versions of reality, involving the 
polarization of light and the spin of particles, are given in appendices A1 and A2.  
These two phenomena are important because they are often used in theoretical 
arguments, both here and in the general literature, and in the experiments employed 
to test the peculiarities of quantum mechanics.   
 
 D. Nuclear decay.  We first consider the wave function of a single 
radioactive nucleus.  In the mathematics of quantum mechanics, there is both a part 
of the wave function corresponding to an undecayed nucleus and a part 
corresponding to a decayed (spontaneously split into several parts) nucleus.  That 
is, the state of the system at a given time is 
 
[the nucleus radioactively decays] 
and, simultaneously 
[the same nucleus does not decay] 
 
Both potential versions of reality, both branches of the wave function exist 
simultaneously!  One cannot get around this; all the successes of QM absolutely 
depend on it. 
 Note that we are not saying at this point whether ‘the nucleus itself’ is both 
decayed and undecayed.  We are simply saying here that in the mathematics, ‘the 
nucleus’ is both decayed and undecayed.  (But in section 6 we will claim there is no 
such thing as the nucleus; instead there are several quantum versions of the 
nucleus.) 
  
 E. Schrödinger’s cat.  The Schrödinger’s cat experiment (1935) is a clever 
and dramatic way of boosting this strange multi-reality situation from the atomic 
(nuclear) to the macroscopic level.  A cat is put in a box along with a vial of 
cyanide.  Outside the box are a radioactive source and a detector of the radiation.  
The detector is turned on for five seconds and then turned off.  If it records one or 
more counts of radiation, an electrical signal is sent to the box, the vial of cyanide 
is broken, and the cat dies.  If it records no counts, nothing happens and the cat 
lives. 
 Classically, there is no problem here (unless you are a cat lover).  Either a 
nucleus radioactively decays, the cat dies and you perceive a dead cat when you 
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open the box; or no nucleus decays, the cat lives and you perceive a live cat.  
Schematically, in the classical case, 
 
either 
[nucleus decays] [cat dies] [you perceive a dead cat] 
or 
[no nucleus decays] [cat lives] [you perceive a live cat] 
 
 But this is not what happens in the quantum case.  There, the wave function 
of the nucleus, the cat, and you (as the observer) is 
 
[nucleus decays] 
[cat dies] 
[version 1 of you perceives a dead cat] 
and, simultaneously 
[nucleus does not decay] 
[cat lives] 
[version 2 of you perceives a live cat] 
 
There are now two full-blown, simultaneously existing versions of physical reality.  
In one, there is a dead version of the cat, in the other there is a live version.  In one, 
version 1 of you perceives a dead cat, in the other, version 2 of you perceives a live 
cat.  So in quantum mechanics, there are two simultaneously existing, equally valid 
versions of you, each perceiving something different!   
 In reality, your perceptions will correspond to one version or the other (but 
that does not necessarily imply that only one version ‘exists’). 
 
 
 
2. Quantum Principles of Perception. 
 
 We will indicate here that, even though its mathematics contains many 
versions of reality, quantum mechanics does not conflict with our perception of a 
seemingly classical world, where by “quantum mechanics”, we mean here the 
QMA scheme of section 4—no particles, no collapse, no ‘sentient beings’, just the 
linear Schrödinger equation for the wave function. 
 
 A. Agreement of quantum mechanics with our perceptions. 
Schrödinger’s cat gives an illustration of a set of general properties which follow 
from the agreement in all known cases between observation and the quantum 
mechanically predicted characteristics of the versions of reality: 
 
[2-1] Quantum mechanics gives many potential versions of reality.  
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[2-2] In all instances where the calculations and observations can be done, 
there is always one and only one version whose characteristics corresponds 
exactly—qualitatively and quantitatively—to our physical perceptions.   
[2-3] Quantum mechanics does not single out any version for perception. 
[2-4] All observers agree on the perceived version. 
 
Property [2-2] is, in my opinion, the pivotal observation in deducing the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  Although a good deal of work needs to be 
done to convincingly show this, it would appear to imply that physical reality is 
composed of wave functions alone, and the wave functions are what ‘we’ perceive. 
 
 B. Versions are in isolated universes.  The most important mathematical 
property of quantum mechanics is that it is a linear theory.  Because of this, when a 
wave function divides into a sum of different versions, each version evolves in time 
entirely independently of the other versions present.  It is as if (See [1], appendix 
A3) 
 
[2-5] Each version of reality corresponds to a different, isolated universe.  
There can be no communication of any kind—via light, sound, touch, email, 
and so on—between the different versions.  
 
 C. Classical consistency of observation.  (See  appendix A3 for details.)  
The tendency is to suppose that, because quantum mechanics contains several 
simultaneously existing versions of reality, it must be that in the un-amended 
theory (no collapse) we should perceive several simultaneous versions of reality, 
akin to a double exposure.  But that is not correct.  In quantum mechanics proper 
(the QMA of section 4), only the versions of the observer perceive.  Each version, 
however, is in a separate, isolated universe and can therefore perceive only what is 
in that universe; a version in one universe can never perceive what occurs in a 
separate universe.  And there is nothing in QMA that perceives in more than one 
universe.  Thus 
 
[2-6] Perception of more than one outcome of an experiment can never 
occur within quantum mechanics. 
 
 Next, if we look in the box twice after doing the Schrödinger’s cat 
experiment, we certainly expect, from experience, to see the same thing both times.  
One can show that this holds in quantum mechanics also. 
 
[2-7] If two observations are made successively, quantum mechanics 
implies the same consistency of results as one obtains in a classical 
universe.   
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[2-8]. A technical version of [2-7] is that if one measures the same property 
twice in a row, quantum mechanics implies one will get the same result. 
 
 Finally, in addition to an observer perceiving only one version of reality, we 
also know experientially that two observers never disagree on what they perceive.  
But this also follows from quantum mechanics.   
 
[2-9] Quantum mechanics implies that two observers can never disagree on 
what they perceive. 
 
 Principles [2-5] through [2-9] constitute much of the content of what is 
called measurement theory.  (There is also a principle about perceiving only the 
eigenvalues of relevant operators, but that is not relevant here.)  They show that in 
all circumstances, quantum mechanics itself implies a ‘classical’ consistency of 
perceptual results even though no classical (that is, single-version-of-reality, effect-
follows-from-cause) reality was assumed. 
 
 
 
3. Randomness and Probability. 
 
 A. Randomness in a Modified Schrödinger’s cat experiment. We wish to 
run this experiment many times, so, to avoid killing so many cats, we will modify 
it.  Instead of the detector being hooked up to the box with the cat inside, it is 
connected to a memory device.  Each time the experiment is run (the detector is 
turned on for 5 seconds and then turned off), the device records a 1 if a decay is 
detected and a 0 if no decay is detected.  On a given run, quantum mechanics does 
not tell us whether a 0 or a 1 will appear. 
 
 B. Probability.  Suppose we run the same experiment 10,000 times and we 
get 6,500 ones (6,500 decays) and 3,500 zeros (3,500 no decays).  Now we run the 
experiment 10,000 times again.  Then, from having done similar sets of 
experiments many times, we know that we will get close to 6,500 ones and 3,500 
zeros.  That is, after many runs of the experiment, the fraction of zeros and ones is 
not just any number between 0 and 1.  Instead it will be near .65 for ones and .35 
for zeros.  That is, there is a probability of approximately .65 of obtaining a one and 
a probability of approximately .35 of obtaining a zero. 
 
 C. Probability and the wave function.  There is a formula linking a 
property of the wave function and probability.  Suppose we focus on a single 
nucleus.  At time 0, say, the nucleus is not decayed, so its wave function is [not 
decayed].  But after 5 seconds, its wave function is a combination of [not decayed] 
and [decayed].  This is written as a sum in quantum mechanics, so we have 
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[wave fcn after 5 sec]=a(0)[not decayed]+a(1)[decayed] 
 
The a(0) and a(1) are ‘coefficients;’ their values—actually their values squared—
tell ‘how much’ of the wave function corresponds to not decayed and how much to 
decayed.  Pictorially, |a(0)|2 and |a(1)| 2 tell ‘how much’ of the ‘mist’ making up the 
wave function is in the not-decayed aspect and how much is in the decayed aspect. 
 The link to probability is the following:  Suppose 
 
|a(0)|2 =.35,   |a(1)| 2 =.65. 
 
Then the probability of perceiving [not decayed] is .35 and the probability of 
perceiving [decayed] is .65.  
 
 D. The |a(i)|2 probability law. As before, we start out at time 0 in the [not 
decayed] state.  As time progresses, the state will be some combination of [not 
decayed] and [decayed]. 
 
[wave function at time t]=a(0,t)[not decayed]+a(1,t)[decayed] 
1|),1(||),0(| 22  tata  
 
The probabilities for the two states at time t are then 
 
probability of not decayed at time t=|a(0,t)| 2 
probability of decayed at time t=|a(1,t)| 2 
 
 This statement generalizes.  Suppose at time t, the quantum state of a 
system is the sum of several possibilities,  iia |)( , with the ith possible atomic-
level  state, i| , having coefficient a(i).  Then 
 
[3-1]  The |a(i)|2 probability law.  If an experiment is run many times, a 
physical reality with characteristics corresponding to version i will be 
perceived a fraction |a(i)|2 of the time. 
 
Exactly the same law, but in a different guise, is called the 2|)(| x  probability law, 
or the Born rule (Born first proposed the idea of probability in 1927), where )(x  
is the wave function at position x.  (In the 2|)(| x  form, it is often interpreted as 
implying that the probability of finding ‘the particle’ at x is 2|)(| x .  But this is an 
unwarranted interpretation; see section 6 on the non-existence of particles.)   
 
 E. Conservation of probability.  There are two important points about 
principle [3-1]. The first is that coefficients a(i) are determined by the Schrödinger 
equation.  The second is that, even though the coefficients may change in time, the 
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sum of the coefficients squared is always 1 (because of the special nature of the 
Schrödinger equation).  And so, from principle [3-1], the sum of the probabilities is 
always 1, exactly as it should be.  This is called conservation of probability.  
 
 F. Perception vs. ‘actuality.’ Because our world appears to be objective, it 
is most natural to assume there is a single, actual, objective outcome to an 
experiment.  But one is not allowed, a priori, to make that assumption when 
dealing with the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  In fact, as we indicated in 
section 2, the perceptions predicted by quantum mechanics agree quite well with 
what we actually perceive without assuming there is just a single version of reality.   
 
 G. Consistency of quantum mechanics proper and the probability law. 
Principle [3-1] cannot be deduced solely from the Schrödinger equation plus the 
properties of the wave functions.  However, suppose we agree that the probability 
of perceiving outcome i is a function of |a(i)|2 so that )|)((|)( 2iafip  .  Then there 
are several ways to show that the only functional form consistent with the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics is the conventional 22 |)(|)|)((| iaiaf  .  The 
law 222 )|)((|)|)((| iaiaf  ,  for example, would give inconsistent results.  I think 
this observation, that  
 
[3-2] The |a(i)|2 probability law is the only functional form consistent with 
the rest of conventional quantum mechanics. 
 
strongly suggests that the origin of the law must, to a large extent, somehow be 
within conventional quantum mechanics, even though we haven’t yet figured out 
how to show this (see, however, the probability subsection of section 9).  That is, it 
doesn’t make sense for there to be a probabilistic ‘mechanism’ that is entirely 
independent of the laws of quantum mechanics, but just happens to be consistent 
with those laws. 
 
 
 
4. Basic Quantum Mechanics, QMA. 
 We know from principle [2-2] that quantum mechanics, by itself, does an 
excellent job of describing physical reality.  This suggests we first try an 
interpretation in which there is only quantum mechanics itself, and then examine it 
to see if it is adequate for describing all physical phenomena. 
 To that end, we suppose that only the wave function, which obeys a linear 
equation, exists.  There are to be (1) no particles and there is to be (2) no collapse 
of the wave function down to just one version.  (That is, it is not the case that we 
perceive a live cat because the dead cat wave function has collapsed to zero and no 
longer exists.)  Further, there are to be (3) no ‘sentient beings’, outside the laws of 
quantum mechanics that ‘look into’ physical reality and perceive just one version.  
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(And there is to be no a priori assumption that the probability law holds; see 
principle [5-3].)  We call this scheme in which only the wave function exists, 
QMA.  
 We have already shown in section 2 that QMA can account for all the 
‘everyday’ characteristics of our perceptions—perceiving only one version of 
reality, agreement among observers, and so on.  However, in section 5 we show 
that QMA can not account for the probability law.  That is, the probability law 
cannot be derived from the other principles of QMA, and it cannot simply be 
assumed as a postulate added to the three properties of QMA.  This implies that, to 
account for the probability law, QMA must be supplemented by some mechanism 
that singles out just one version of the observer as the one corresponding to our 
perceptions (principle [5-2]). 
 One possible singling out mechanism is to suppose that physical reality 
consists of particles as well as the wave function.  A particle ‘rides along’ on just 
one version of the wave function and that version is the one we perceive.  We show 
in section 6, however, that in spite of the conventional view, there is currently no 
evidence whatsoever for particles, and there is very little chance that any evidence 
for them will be found in the future.  Thus the existence of particles will not do as a 
singling out mechanism.  A second possible singling out mechanism is collapse of 
the wave function.  But we show in section 7 that, as with particles, there is 
currently no evidence whatsoever for collapse and it is difficult to construct a 
satisfactory theory of this proposed interpretation.  Thus collapse also will not do, 
at this time, as a singling out mechanism.   
 This leaves, as far as I know, only one possible singling out mechanism, the 
‘sentient being’ option described in section 9.  In this interpretive scheme, the 
physics is QMA—no particles and no collapse so that all versions of the wave 
function exist forever.  But associated with each person is a Mind, outside the laws 
of quantum mechanics, that perceives just one version of the wave function of the 
person’s brain.  Admittedly, this is beyond what is currently considered to be 
scientific.  But the logic—the need for a singling out mechanism, and the current 
‘failure’ of particles and collapse—implies that this is, at present, the most likely 
candidate for the correct interpretation. 
 
 
 
5. Restrictions Imposed on Interpretations by 
the Probability Law. 
 
Everett’s many-worlds interpretation [2] is based strictly on QMA, in which 
it is assumed that (1) only the wave functions, which obey linear Schrödinger 
equations, exist (no particles or hidden variables); (2) there is no collapse of the 
wave function; (3) there are no ‘sentient beings’ outside the laws of quantum 
mechanics.  There is also, in our version of Everett’s interpretation, no a priori 
assumption of a probability law. 
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To see the implications of these assumptions, suppose we do an 
experiment—perhaps a Stern-Gerlach experiment—on an atomic system that has n 
possible states.  Before the experiment, the system has state  
 



n
i
iia
1
|)(|                                                    (5-1) 
 
After the measurement, the detector and observer states become entangled with the 
atomic states.  Version i of you as the observer, i,obs|  reads the outcome of 
version i of the detector, idet,| which agrees with the state i| of the atomic 
system, so the state of the whole system is  
 
  

iiiia
n
i
,obs|det,||)(|
1
                                       (5-2) 
 
This is the state of the universe in the many-worlds interpretation.  In it, if you are 
the observer, there are n versions of you!  Quantum mechanics does not distinguish 
between versions, so there is an equally valid version of you perceiving each 
outcome; that is, no version is singled out as the you.    
 
 To see if this multiple-versions-of-you scenario gives a reasonable 
interpretation, under the assumption that our current perceptions correspond to 
those of one of the versions of the observer, we first need to check whether the 
perceptions of each version violate any of our experiential perceptual rules.  From 
section 2, we see that each version perceives a single version of reality; that two 
observers never disagree; and that successive measurements are consistent.  And, 
using the results from section 2, and anticipating those from section 6, we see that 
each version will perceive a universe that appears to be made of classical, localized 
particles.  So the many-worlds, QMA-based interpretation, strange as it seems with 
its many versions of each of us, appears to do an excellent job. 
 
 Problems with the probability law.  There is, however, one major 
problem with the QMA scheme—the |a(i)|2 probability law of principle [3-1].  This 
law cannot hold within the many-worlds interpretation.  We will give a simple form 
of the argument here, with more detailed arguments given in appendix A4 here and 
in [1], appendix A5. 
 
│ We work from Eq. (5-2).  First, the only entities that perceive in 
│QMA are the versions of the observer, so all statements about perception 
│must refer to the perceptions of the versions of the observer.  Second, one 
│might conjecture that only one version of the observer is ‘aware.’  But one 
│can show ([1], appendix A6) that all versions are equally aware.   
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│ Now each version, iobs,| , of the observer perceives its respective 
│outcome—by looking at the corresponding version, idet,| , of the 
│detector—with 100% probability.  There is nothing probabilistic in the 
│perception process; there is simply each equally valid version of the 
│observer perceiving its associated outcome.  Thus there is no apparent 
│way to introduce probability of perception (principle [3-1]) into QMA. 
│ One might be tempted to argue that the probability comes in the 
│assignment of my perceptions to the perceptions of one of the versions; 
│sometimes my perceptions correspond to those of version 1,| obs , 
│sometimes to those of version 2,| obs  and so on, with the probability of 
│assignment to version iobs,|  being |a(i)|2.  The problem with this 
│conjecture, however, is that when we say ‘my perceptions’, we are 
│implicitly assuming the existence of a single, unique me, separate from the 
│versions.  But there is no unique me separate from the versions in QMA; if 
│there are n versions, there are always n equally valid me’s.  This argument 
│is expanded in appendix A4.   
 
The consequence is that  
 
[5-1] The probability law cannot hold in the bare QMA scheme, where all 
versions of the observer are perceptually equivalent on each run.  
 
Further, one version must be singled out—see appendix A4—as the one 
corresponding to my perceptions.   
 
[5-2] The probability law implies there must be some mechanism, not 
within QMA, which singles out one version of the observer as the one 
corresponding to my perceptions.   
 
In addition, we argue in appendix A4 that 
 
[5-3] One cannot does not obtain a satisfactory interpretive scheme by 
simply adding the probability law as a postulate to the three principles of 
QMA because the singling out mechanism required by [5-2] is not specified 
in that scheme. 
 
Principles [5-1], [5-2] and [5-3] provide significant constraints on interpretations. 
 
 
 
6. No Evidence for Particles.  Wave-Particle Duality. 
 The concept of particles would seem to be a ‘given’.  From grade school to 
graduate school we are told that matter is made up of particles—electrons, protons, 
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and neutrons.  On the other hand, in quantum mechanics there is the idea of wave-
particle duality; sometimes matter acts like it is made of particles, sometimes it acts 
like it is made of waves (the wave function).  But what is matter?  Is it actually 
sometimes a particle and then, in different circumstances it becomes a wave? 
 
 To answer, we start from principle [2-2]:  One version of the wave function 
always corresponds exactly to our perceptions.  From this result (ignoring our 
cultural heritage concerning particles), our first hypothesis would be that matter 
consists of the wave function alone.  So we will assume this and then investigate 
whether there are any observations or experiments that require the existence of 
particles for their explanation.  If there are not, if we find that the concept of 
particles is not necessary to explain any result, and if the likelihood of discovering 
any result requiring particles in the future is small, then we can declare that the 
concept of particles is superfluous.  If that is the case, then matter consists of wave 
functions alone. 
 
 There are many experiments that one could use to reputedly show the 
necessity for particles, but all the arguments depend on just a few principles and 
properties (which all turn out to be invalid).  They are: 
 
(1) The classical particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin 
and charge are presumed to be properties of particles. 
(2) The conservation and addition laws for energy, momentum, spin 
(angular momentum), and charge were established in classical, particle-
based physics so their experimental verification is presumed to imply the 
existence of particles. 
(3) Particles produce localized effects, so experimentally observed localized 
effects are presumed to imply the existence of particles. 
(4) A small part of a classical wave, say a light or sound wave, carries a 
correspondingly small part of the energy and momentum of the wave, so the 
same is presumed to hold for the wave function. 
(5) Because quantum mechanics gives several version of reality, it is 
presumed that we would perceive several versions of reality if there were no 
particles.  We have seen in section 2, however, that this is not correct; more 
than one version is never perceived in quantum mechanics. 
 
6A. Group Representation Theory. 
 We will examine (1) and (2) here.  What we find is that mass, energy, 
momentum, spin and charge are actually properties of the wave function!  In 
addition, the conservation laws also hold in quantum mechanics.  The method used 
is the mathematical discipline of group representation theory, which I will endeavor 
to explain in a way suitable for non-specialists. 
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 Physical and mathematical invariance.  Ignoring gravity, we don’t expect 
the results of experiments to depend either upon the orientation (east-west, north-
south, up-down) or the position of the experimental apparatus.  This constitutes 
physical rotational and translational invariance (no variation in the results for 
changes in orientation or position). 
 The equations governing physical phenomena should reflect this invariance.  
Suppose we take the Schrödinger equation for the hydrogen atom.  Then it should 
be (and is) independent of how the xyz coordinates are oriented.  So the equation 
must be invariant under any rotation of the coordinate system (that is, the form of 
the equation is the same no matter whether you express it in terms of the original 
coordinates, xyz, or in terms of the rotated coordinates, x´y´z´).  The set of all 
possible rotations, along with the rules for how two successive rotations give a 
third, constitute a mathematical entity called the three-dimensional rotation group. 
 
 The hydrogen atom and the invariance chain.  Because the equation for 
the hydrogen atom wave function is invariant under (the group of) rotations, one 
can prove that the solutions to the equation can be classified or labeled according to 
their angular momentum, or spin as it is usually called (see appendix A2).  But this 
is not just a mathematical classification scheme.  If a Stern-Gerlach experiment 
(A2) is done on the atom, one actually gets different, measurable results for the 
different spins.  Thus we have this interesting chain—from physical invariance 
(rotations shouldn’t matter in the outcome) to mathematical invariance to a 
mathematical classification scheme for different wave functions to an actual, 
physical, measurable property of the wave function. 
 
 The full set of physical invariances.  Physical laws are not just invariant 
under three-dimensional rotations.  They are also invariant under relativistic 
‘rotations’ in the four dimensions of space and time.  Further, they are invariant 
under translations in space and time.   
 There is also one more kind of invariance, that of the ‘internal’ symmetry 
group.  Physicists had noticed that there are certain regularities in the properties of 
the many ‘elementary’ particles discovered.  It has been found that these 
regularities correspond to invariance under a set of non-space-time rotations—for 
example rotations in a complex three dimensional space for quarks or perhaps a 
complex five [3,4] or six [5] dimensional space if electrons and neutrinos are 
included. 
 
 Mass, energy, momentum, spin and charge.  As in the hydrogen atom 
case, the physical invariances lead, through the above chain of reasoning, to 
physical, measurable properties of the solutions to the invariant equations.  These 
properties are mass, energy, momentum and spin for the space-time group [6], and 
the strong, electromagnetic and weak charges for the internal symmetry group.  
Thus the properties—mass, …, charge (weak, strong, electromagnetic)—that we 
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attributed to particles in classical physics are actually seen to be properties of the 
quantum mechanical wave function!! 
 
[6-1] Linearity and the physical invariance properties—relativistic rotations, 
translations, internal symmetries—imply the particle-like properties of 
mass, energy, momentum, spin and charge are properties of the wave 
function. 
 
[6-2] Linearity and the invariance properties also imply that the usual 
conservation laws and laws of addition for energy, momentum, spin and 
charge hold in quantum mechanics. 
 
 One might object that the quantities derived from group representation 
theory actually refer back to properties of the particles ‘associated with’ the wave 
functions.  But all the mathematical apparatus used to derive [6-1] and [6-2] 
referred only to the wave functions.  There is no reason, at least on this account, to 
add an extra concept (particles) to the structure of physical existence when that 
concept never occurred in our deliberations. 
 
 Significance of this result I.  It is truly astonishing that the existence of the 
centuries-old classical properties of particles, mass, …, charge, is derived in 
quantum mechanics.   
 The inputs to this derivation are the invariance principles and the linearity 
of the quantum mechanical equations.  The fact that the consequences of these 
inputs give the known properties of particles is probably as close as one can come 
to a proof that invariance and linearity are absolute principles in the description of 
physical existence. 
 
 Significance of this result II.  The fact that the classical particle-like 
properties are actually properties of the wave functions severely undermines the 
rationale for assuming the existence of particles. 
 
 Significance of this result III.  The physical particle-like states of quantum 
mechanics, in ket notation, are written as QsSpEm z ,,,,,|  (mass, energy, 
momentum, spin, z component of spin, and the three charges).  That is, all the 
labels on states are group representational quantities.  Further, the antisymmetry 
of fermions and the symmetric statistics of bosons are also group representational 
properties (associated with the permutation group).  This suggests that quantum 
mechanics as we know it is the representational form of an underlying, pre-
representational, linear, appropriately invariant theory (see [5]). 
 
 
6B. Localization.  
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There is one particle-like property that is not related to group representation theory, 
that of localization.  Speaking classically, the carriers of mass and charge seem to 
be very small, almost point-like, with highly localized effects.   
 This particle-like localization occurs in an interesting way in quantum 
mechanical experiments.  To illustrate, suppose we have a single light wave 
function that goes through a single slit and impinges on a screen covered with film 
grains.  The wave function spreads out after going through the slit and hits many 
grains of film.  But surprisingly, a microscopic search will show that only one of 
the grains will be exposed by the light.  It is as if there were a particle of light, a 
photon, hidden in the wave function, and it is the single grain hit by the particle that 
is exposed. 
 As another example, suppose we have a target proton surrounded by a 
sphere coated with film grains on the inside.  An electron (electron-like wave 
function) is shot at the proton and the wave function of the electron spreads out in 
all directions, hitting every grain.  But again, a microscopic examination will show 
that one and only one grain is exposed.  As in the case of light, it is as if a 
particulate electron embedded in the wave function followed a particular trajectory 
and hit and exposed only one grain. 
 
 Quantum mechanical explanation.  Surprisingly, this exposure of only 
one localized grain by a spread-out wave function can be accounted for strictly 
from the principles of quantum mechanics, without invoking the existence of 
particles.  It depends on the linearity of the theory. 
 We suppose in the electron scattering example that there is an interaction 
),gr( iV between the electron wave function and each of the N grains, i,gr| .  Just 
before the wave function hits the grains, we can schematically write the state and 
electron-grain interaction as 
 
 
 







NNV
NV
NV
NNV
NV
NV
NNVV
gr||)gr(elec|...2gr1gr|
...gr|...2gr|)2gr(elec|1gr|
gr|...2gr|1gr|)1gr(elec|
gr|...2gr|1gr|)gr(elec|
...gr|...2gr|1gr|)2gr(elec|
gr|...2gr|1gr|)1gr(elec|
gr|...1gr|)gr(...)1gr(elec|
                (6-1) 
 
where we have used allowable rules of re-arrangement of the N terms to arrive at 
the final form.  In the first term of the last three lines, the electron wave function, 
through the grain 1 interaction term, interacts with and exposes only grain 1.  In the 
 19 
second, only grain 2 is exposed, …, and in the last term, only grain N is exposed.  
Thus the final state is (with the asterisk indicating an exposed grain) 
 
*gr|grinelec|...2gr|1gr|
...gr|...*2gr|2grinelec|1gr|
gr|...2gr|*1gr|1grinelec|



NN
N
N
                        (6-2) 
 
│We have assumed that in each term, the electron—or rather a portion of 
│the electron-like wave function—ends up lodged in the exposed grain.  
│Note that the small portion of the electron-like wave function that lodges 
│in each grain carries the full mass, charge and spin that we associate with 
│an electron—see [1],  appendix A7—so that each of the N versions of 
│reality has the correct charge and spin.  
 
That is, there are N terms and only one grain is exposed in each term.  But we 
know from section 2 that only one term will be perceived.  And since each term has 
just one localized grain exposed (no matter what the size of the grains), only one 
localized grain will be perceived as exposed, even though the electron wave 
function hits all the grains!  Thus 
 
[6-3]  A spread-out wave function leads to perceptually localized effects. 
 
 It is remarkable that quantum mechanics alone, with no assumption of the 
existence of particles, can imitate, in our perceptions, the classical idea of a 
localized (only one localized grain exposed) particle. 
 
 Particle-like trajectories. In cloud and bubble chambers, a spread-out 
wave function is found to produce more or less continuous, particle-like 
trajectories.  Reasoning similar to the above, applied several times, shows this also 
follows from quantum mechanics alone.  (The ‘continuity’ follows because the 
wave functions of successive nucleation centers are entangled; in each term, the 
next nucleation center ‘nucleates’ only if the previous one nucleated.) 
 
6C. No Evidence for Particles. 
Wave-Particle Duality. 
If one ignores some of the principles we have derived, as is often done in 
interpretations, one way of attempting to explain why we perceive only one of the 
versions of reality given by quantum mechanics, and why our world appears 
particle-like, is to suppose that the wave function is not the physical reality we 
perceive.  Instead there is an actual, unique physical existence, made up perhaps of 
particles which ride along within just one of the versions, and it is that physical 
reality which we perceive.  This, in fact, is the view of the majority of scientists and 
non-scientists alike.  If you look in a typical modern physics text, you will find 
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analyses of experiments—the Compton and photoelectric effects, for example—
which reputedly prove particles are necessary for understanding physical existence.   
But the problem with these arguments is that they do not take into account 
all the properties—well-known and not so well-known—of the wave function.  If 
these are taken into account, then one can show that all five of the presumed 
particle-related properties of matter can be explained by properties of the wave 
function alone.   And that in turn implies that all experiments which seem to require 
the existence of particles can be explained within quantum mechanics, without the 
hypothesis that particles exist. 
 
Wave-particle duality and the explanation of experiments.  It is useful to 
approach the explanations from the perspective of wave-particle duality.  (See 
appendix A5, on the double-slit experiment, for an example where wave and 
particle properties occur in the same experiment.)  The classically wave-like and 
classically particle-like properties of matter are: 
 
Wave-like properties. 
Diffraction (single slit) 
Interference (double slit) 
Properties of a fraction of a wave. 
 
Particle-like properties. 
Mass, energy, momentum, spin. 
Charge. 
Localization and particle-like trajectories. 
 
 Wave-like properties.  The first two wave-like properties follow for the 
wave function from the linearity of the quantum equations of motion.  The third 
property, however, is interesting because it differs for classical waves and the wave 
function.  In a classical wave, a water wave or sound wave, for example, a small 
part of the wave carries only a correspondingly small part of the energy and 
momentum of the wave.  But it is shown in [1] appendix A7 that 
 
 [6-4] A small part of a wave function carries the full mass, spin, charge, 
energy and momentum.   
 
 What about light waves, which correspond both to classical waves and to 
photon-like wave functions?  A portion of a classical light wave, say a beam of 
light, is composed of many millions of photon-like wave functions.  And so it is 
indeed true that a portion of the beam carries a corresponding portion of the energy 
and momentum because it carries a portion of the ‘photons’.  But for a single 
photon wave function, a small portion of it carries the full energy and momentum.  
(Energy and momentum add across products of wave functions in quantum 
mechanics, but not across sums.) 
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 Particle-like properties.  We have shown that the classical particle-like 
properties—mass,…, charge, localization—are actually properties of the wave 
functions.   
 
 Compton scattering and the photoelectric effect.  Perhaps the most 
convincing ‘evidence’ for the existence of particles comes from these two 
experiments, which both involve the interaction between light and electrons.  In it, 
if one assumes there are particulate electrons and photons that carry energy and 
momentum, and if one employs conservation of energy and momentum, then one 
can explain the experimental results.  But we have seen that energy and momentum 
are properties of the wave functions, and that the conservation laws also hold in 
quantum mechanics.  These, combined with the third property of waves for wave 
functions (a portion of the wave carries the full energy and momentum), are 
sufficient to derive the Compton and photoelectric results without assuming the 
existence of particles (either photons or electrons).  Thus, because quantum 
mechanics alone, without the presumption of particles, can explain Compton 
scattering and the photoelectric effect, these two experimental results do not 
provide evidence for the existence of particles.   
 The same conclusion holds for all other experiments that allegedly give 
evidence for the existence of particles.  Thus, 
 
[6-5]  There is no evidence for the existence of particles. 
 
And since there is no evidence, there is no reason to assume particles exist. 
 Nomenclature.  Even though there is no evidence for particles, it is not 
necessary to give up the very useful names.  So we can agree that an ‘electron’ 
refers to an electron-like wave function, having mass em , spin ½, charge, e ; a 
‘proton’ refers to a proton-like wave function, having mass pm , spin ½, charge, 
e ; and a ‘photon’ refers to a photon-like wave function having mass 0, spin 1, 
and charge 0.  But we must keep in mind that these names do not (if there is no 
collapse) refer to entities that objectively exist in a unique state; there can be 
several versions of them simultaneously existing in different states. 
 Related experiments.  There are several experiments that, if one assumes 
particles exist, give perplexing results.  Bell-like experiments (appendix A6) [7,8] 
on non-locality seem to show that particles interact instantaneously at a distance.  
And Wheeler’s delayed-choice experiment (A7) [9,10] and the quantum eraser 
experiment (A8) [11,12] seem to imply that causality can sometimes work 
backwards in time.  But if one assumes there are no particles, the very peculiar 
inferences about the nature of reality simply evaporate, as is shown in appendices 
A7 and A8.   In a no-particle world, there is (to the best of my knowledge) no 
evidence for backwards causality.  And while there are non-local effects in 
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quantum mechanics, built into the theory by entanglement, there is no faster-than-
light signaling required to explain the results; it is just quantum mechanics as usual. 
 The Copenhagen and Transactional Analysis Interpretations.  In the 
Copenhagen interpretation (which has several forms), the defining idea is that the 
physical world divides into an atomic-level world where wave function behavior 
dominates and a macroscopic, people-level ‘classical’ world.  The make-up of the 
classical world is not usually specified, but it presumably consists of classical 
particles.  We see from the above reasoning that—in addition to this macroscopic-
microscopic division being logically suspect—this interpretation cannot be 
sustained because there is no evidence for anything being in existence besides the 
wave functions.  That is, the Copenhagen interpretation, the oldest and most 
popular of the interpretations, has no logical basis. 
 There is also a ‘transactional analysis’ interpretation [13,14] which uses the 
idea of particulate photons being emitted from sources.  Because there is no 
evidence for the existence of photons, this interpretation also cannot be sustained. 
 
6D. Hidden Variable Interpretations. 
 It has been conjectured that even though one cannot show there are 
particles, there may still be ‘hidden’ (not detectable by experiment) variables that 
determine the unique outcome of an experiment, the outcome we perceive.  At a 
given time, there is only one, unique set of these hidden variables (as opposed to 
the many versions of reality of the wave function), so they are objective.   
 The first observation is that 
 
[6-6] There is no experimental evidence for hidden variables. 
 
Second, there is no definitive proof that there cannot be a hidden variable theory 
underlying quantum mechanics.  And third, there is no acceptable hidden variable 
theory at this time, and one encounters severe difficulties in attempting to construct 
a satisfactory hidden variable theory underlying quantum mechanics. 
 
 Bohm’s model.  The most nearly successful hidden variable theory is that 
of Bohm [15,16].  Although it falls short, there are several reasons for presenting it.  
First, it is successful in achieving its goal if one ignores certain shortcomings.  
Second, it is pretty much the only even minimally acceptable hidden variable 
model.  Third, any acceptable hidden variable theory would presumably have to 
reduce to Bohm’s model in many situations.  And fourth, it serves as a testing 
ground for conjectured ‘no-go’ theorems—arguments which purport to prove that 
hidden variables are impossible. 
 
│ In this model, Bohm derived a set of trajectories through space from 
│the Schrödinger equation (the velocity of the trajectory through point x is 
│essentially the gradient of the phase angle, )(x , of the wave function).  
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│He then assumed that for each ‘particle-like’ wave function, a ‘particle’ 
│was put on one of the trajectories.  This particle then followed a very 
│complex trajectory.  The hidden variables in this case are the position and 
│velocity of the particle. 
│ To explain the success of the theory, we will use the example of a 
│Stern-Gerlach experiment (appendix A2) on a spin 1 particle (particle-like 
│wave function).  The z-component of spin of this wave function can take 
│on the three values 1,0,1  .  When this wave function is shot through a 
│magnetic field, the three parts of the wave function each follow separate 
│trajectories, so the wave function, schematically, is 
│ 
│                  )()1()()0()()1( 101 xaxaxa                            (6-3) 
│ 
│where the different wave functions ),(),(),( 101 xxx  correspond to 
│the different trajectories.  For each run of the experiment, the probability 
│law tells us that the probability of the particle following trajectory i is 
│ 2|)(| ia . 
│ We now suppose the spin 1 particle consists of two spin 0 particles 
│in a bound state (like the electron and proton in a hydrogen atom, ignoring 
│the spin ½ ) and apply the Bohm model to this situation.  Before the 
│particle reaches the magnetic field, the two particles bound together will 
│follow trajectories that move very rapidly through the three possible spin 1 
│states.  And then at the magnetic field, the trajectory of the bound state 
│will follow just one of the three possible paths.  The success of Bohm’s 
│model is that it predicts that path i will be followed a fraction 2|)(| ia  of 
│the time, so that the probability law is satisfied. 
  
Now for the problems with the model.   
│ First, it is not relativistic, and because of the way in which time is 
│used, it is difficult to generalize it to a relativistic formulation (and 
│physical theories must be relativistic).   
│ Second, there are as-yet-unsolved problems in handling the creation 
│and annihilation of particles.   
│ Third, one must assume a specialized initial density of trajectories in 
│order to obtain the probability law, and there is no clear reason why 
│nature should choose that density.   
│ Fourth, it is an arbitrary feature of the model that a particle is put on 
│just one of the trajectories.  There is nothing in the mathematics that 
│prevents there being two particles, on two different trajectories, associated 
│with a ‘single particle’ wave function [17].  And it is extremely difficult to 
│reformulate the Bohm model with a ‘source’ equation which forces there 
│to be one and only one particle associated with a single particle wave 
│function [17]. 
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 Finally, there is the problem of ‘conscious’  perception.  The wave function 
does not collapse and so there is a valid quantum state of the observer’s brain 
corresponding to each outcome.  There is nothing in the mathematics of the theory 
which says that only the version of the brain associated with the particle is 
‘consciously aware’.  To put it conversely, an acceptable no-collapse hidden 
variable theory must give a convincing reason for why the non-particled quantum 
versions of the observer are not aware.  Such a reason is not given in the Bohm 
model, and I don’t believe it can be given in any hidden variable model.  Thus we 
have  
 
[6-7]* It appears to be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to explain in any 
non-collapse hidden variable model why the quantum versions of the brain 
not associated with the hidden variables cannot be consciously aware. 
 
(This principle is less certain than the others, hence the asterisk.)  One cannot 
simply say “Well, that’s just the way Nature works” because, in ‘being-less’ hidden 
variable schemes, there is no arbiter, no outside intelligence that could make the 
choice between particled and not-particled quantum versions.  And there is nothing 
that is aware of only particles or their state (and the particles themselves are not 
assumed to be aware).  There is not even a current understanding of what conscious 
awareness is to base one’s argument on. 
 If one takes a different tack and conjectures that the hidden variables change 
the structure of the ‘particled’ quantum version of the brain in some subtle way, 
that is a whole different kind of hidden variable theory.  It runs up against the 
successes of no-hidden-variable quantum mechanics. 
    
 My conclusion is that, even though there is no proof that there cannot be an 
underlying hidden variable theory, the construction of such a theory is fraught with 
difficulties, and is probably not possible.  
 
 
7. Collapse Interpretations. 
 
 Another way of attempting to explain why we perceive only one version of 
reality is to suppose that the wave function somehow collapses down to just one 
version [18].  In Schrödinger’s cat, for example, the dead cat version of reality 
might collapse to zero—that is, it would simply go out of existence—leaving just 
the live cat version to be perceived.   
 There have been a number of searches for experimental evidence of 
collapse, including interference effects for large molecules, SQUID experiments, 
and constraints set by nuclear processes [19-21].  But none of them has found any 
evidence whatsoever for collapse.   
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[7-1] In spite of a number of attempts, no experimental evidence for 
collapse has been found. 
 
(Note also section 3F.  The simple fact that we perceive only one version of reality 
does not constitute experimental evidence that the others have collapsed to zero.) 
 
 Mathematical theories of collapse.  The primary (and just about the only) 
mathematical theory of collapse is the one proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber, 
[22]and Pearle [23].  A random force is introduced into the time evolution of the 
wave function in such a way that, after a short period of time, a microsecond or less 
for systems with many particles, there is a collapse of the wave function down to 
just one version (without affecting the ‘shape’ of the wave function).  The 
coefficients of all the other versions effectively shrink to zero, so those versions 
simply go out of existence.  This idea is beautifully implemented in the Pearle 
model.  But even though the mathematics is elegant, there are difficulties with the 
physical implications of the scheme [21]:  
•There must be instantaneous coordination of billions of random events 
located far from each other (and for that reason, one is currently not able to 
make the theory relativistic).   
•The coordination extends across versions, which is strictly forbidden in 
conventional quantum mechanics, because versions don’t communicate. 
•The random event ‘chosen’ at time t depends on the results of the choice at 
time t, (rather than at time dtt   as is usual in a physically applicable 
differential equation) which seems physically awkward. 
•The linearity of quantum mechanics must be abandoned ([1], appendix 
A12), which runs counter to the group representational analysis in section 6, 
as well as to all the successes of quantum mechanics.   
• The specific Pearle method of collapse, using particle number, doesn’t 
work in all situations.   
• Finally, the specific and very specialized form assumed (not derived) for 
the randomizing Hamiltonian just happens to give the |a(i)|2 probability law 
which agrees with the rest of quantum mechanics (see principle [3-2] and 
the comment at the end of section 3). 
Because there are no other serious candidates for a mathematical theory of collapse, 
and also because some or all of these problems would be expected to occur for any 
model, there is currently no reason to suppose that mathematically implemented 
collapse is the solution to the problem of perception of only one version of reality. 
[Actually the problem is not the perception of only one version—see section 
2; the problem is why the probability law holds.  The GRW-P model does 
indeed give the probability law, but it has the problems just described.] 
 
 Collapse by conscious perception.  To summarize the reasoning of this 
section so far, we have seen that there is no evidence for the existence of anything 
besides the wave function.  We have also seen that there is no experimental or 
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theoretical evidence for a mathematical theory of collapse to just one version.  And 
yet we know from section 5 that one version must be singled out for perception, by 
some means, if the probability law is to hold.  One possible singling out 
mechanism, the one addressed here, is that there is indeed collapse, but it is 
initiated by conscious perception, rather than by a mathematical process based on 
random variables [18,24]. 
 However, because an instantaneous collapse ,  jiai || , suspends the 
usual Schrödinger equation mathematics for an instant, this option has the 
disadvantage that the conscious perception of a human being—a slippery concept, 
subject to wandering attention, impaired perception and so on—disrupts the 
mathematics.  Further, the collapse changes the wave function in such a way that 
even though the Schrödinger equation has been suspended, the wave function is 
still a solution to the equation when it comes out the other side of the collapse.  In 
addition this instantaneous process adheres to the probability law, collapsing to 
state j|  on a fraction 2|)(| ja of the runs.  This creates difficulties which are 
discussed in appendix A9.  This consciousness-triggered intervention in the 
mathematics, tailored to the situation with no apparent way of verifying the 
assumptions, and with no explanation for why the ‘collapsing agent’ adheres to the 
probability law (see principle [3-2]), does not seem to me to be a likely way for 
Nature to proceed.  Further, it is shown in section 9 that one can obtain essentially 
the same results without collapse. 
 
 Thus we have the following principle: 
 
[7-2] There is currently no reason to be at all optimistic that there is a theory 
of collapse which augments standard quantum mechanics. 
 
 
 Decoherence and Consistent Histories ‘Interpretations.’  The ideas of 
decoherence [25,26] were not meant as an interpretation but they are sometimes 
construed that way.  In decoherence, the environment often causes a system to 
collapse to just one version.  But the environment cannot do that in general.    
│ To explain, suppose we do a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin ½ 
│silver atom.  As soon as the wave function of the silver atom separates 
│into two non-overlapping parts (as it goes through the magnetic field), the 
│universe is divided into two separate, non-interacting versions (see [1], 
│appendix A3), each of which keeps its same norm (same size, same 
│coefficient).  Nothing in the detectors or the environment in general can 
│change the norms of the two parts once they separate.  Thus there can be 
│no collapse.   
Therefore the physical process of decoherence cannot provide a satisfactory 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The same is true for Consistent Histories 
[27]; it provides no means of collapse in the above example. 
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 Penrose’s gravitational collapse.  Penrose [28] proposed the following (in 
connection with a theory of consciousness!):  Suppose we again do the Stern-
Gerlach experiment so there are two versions of the detecting apparatus and the 
observer.  Since the arrangement of atoms is slightly different in the two versions, 
the definition of space and time—which depends on the distribution of matter—
will be slightly different in the two versions.  Penrose supposed that difference 
caused a ‘tear’ in the fabric of space-time.  This tear would lead to a force that 
would pull the two versions together, thus causing a collapse to just one of them.  
But this inter-version force violates the principle that versions are in separate 
universes which cannot influence one another.  So unless Penrose can show why 
the separate-universe principle doesn’t hold, I don’t believe his interpretation can 
be valid.  
 
 
 
8. Implications of the Principles. 
 
 The interpretation we will consider in section 9 makes use of a “Mind” 
outside the laws of the physical universe.  So, to motivate this radical step, and also 
to bring some order to the interpretive problem, we will review our results so far.  
The question to be answered is: What underlying conceptual picture of reality can 
best link our perceptions with the mathematics of quantum mechanics?   
 We start with the principle  
 
8-1. Physical reality consists of the wave function alone. 
 
To me, the evidence is overwhelming that physical reality consists of the wave 
function alone.  The particle-like properties of mass, energy, momentum, spin, 
charge and localization all follow from the principles of quantum mechanics alone.  
And principle [2-2], that one version of the wave function always agrees exactly 
with our perceptions, makes it a virtual certainty. 
 This implies that Copenhagen-like interpretations which postulate a real 
classical world in addition to the wave function are not likely to prove fruitful.   
 Further, there are interpretations in which it is assumed that quantum 
mechanics gives only statistical information, or information about how we get from 
one state to another, but they do not say anything about the nature of the matter 
itself.  I believe such interpretations are unnecessarily conservative.  In addition,  
they do not give sufficient weight to the non-statistical or ‘absolute’ facts that 
quantum mechanics implies matter has mass, charge, quantized spin, and is 
perceived as localized; and that it gives accurate energy levels for composite 
systems.   
 So we will suppose that the only interpretations worth considering at this 
point are those in which physical reality consists of the wave function alone.  This 
is not a done deal, because there is no proof that hidden variables do not exist, or 
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that there is no collapse.  But in view of our review of the current state of physics, 
it seems like a quite reasonable assumption. 
 Can we use physics to infer the nature of reality?  There is a point of 
view which says that, because we don’t directly perceive anything other than our 
macroscopic world, we have no business inferring anything about the true nature of 
reality from quantum mechanics.  I just don’t buy this no-inference-allowed 
argument.  In fact, I think it works better in reverse. What we are directly aware of 
corresponds solely to our neural representation of reality.  But mathematical 
physics, the distillation of the results of millions of experiments, gives a much more 
detailed, in-depth, and unified picture of the physical world than our sense-based 
view.  Thus the picture of the physical world that mathematical physics gives us—
that we live in a world made of wave functions (see also reference [5] on an 
underlying theory)—is more likely to correspond to a scheme which is closer to the 
‘actual nature’ of reality than the everyday picture given by our neural 
representation. 
 
 A second major principle is 
 
8-2. It is quite reasonable to assume there is no collapse. 
 
This follows from our observation that there is no experimental evidence for 
collapse, from the difficulties encountered in attempting to construct a valid 
mathematical theory of collapse, and from the questionable suggestion that collapse 
is based on conscious perception. 
 
 Third,  
 
8-3. Even if there is no collapse and there are no hidden variables, the 
probability law implies there must be some ‘mechanism’ which singles 
out one version for perception on each run. 
 
And fourth, 
 
8-4. Since there is no singling out mechanism in basic quantum 
mechanics (the QMA of section 4), the mechanism for singling out the 
perceived version of reality must be outside the laws of basic quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 Given 8-1 and 8-2, the only apparent way to single out one version is 
through perception of a single version.  This would seem to imply there is a 
“Mind,” outside the laws of quantum mechanics, which is the source of the 
awareness necessary for perception.  One version of this, the Mind-MIND 
interpretation, is given in the next section. 
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9. The Mind-MIND Interpretation. 
 
 The arguments given in section 6 show we can be quite (although not 
absolutely) certain there are no particles or hidden variables.  And the arguments in 
section 7 indicate we can be fairly certain there is no mathematical or 
consciousness-triggered collapse.  We thus arrive (as in section 8) at the following 
set of ‘idealized’ requirements on an interpretation. 
 
9-1. There are no particles or hidden variables. 
 
9-2. There is no collapse. 
 
9-3. One version must be singled out as the one corresponding to my 
perceptions on each run. 
 
 How do we proceed from here?  To see, suppose we go back to principle  
[2-2]—that our perceptions always correspond exactly to those of one and only one 
version of the observer.  It is as if there is a “Mind,” outside the laws of quantum 
mechanics that is, in some sense, concentrating on and perceiving one quantum 
version of physical reality.  This supposition forms the basis for the Mind-MIND 
interpretation. 
 
 
A. Basics of the Mind-MIND Interpretation  
1. The non-physical Mind. Associated with each individual person is an 
individual Mind that is not subject to the mathematical laws of quantum 
mechanics.  In particular, the Mind has no wave function associated with it.  
We use a capital M to distinguish this Mind from the usual usage of the 
word mind.  Because quantum mechanics describes the physical world so 
well, we will define anything outside its laws to be ‘non-physical.’  So with 
this definition, the Mind is non-physical.  
 
2. The Mind perceives only the brain-body. The individual Mind 
perceives only the wave function of the individual brain (brain-body); it 
does not directly perceive the quantum state of the external world.  This is 
consistent with the fact that we are not directly aware of the external world; 
we are only aware of the neural state of our brain.  The process of 
perception of the wave function by the Mind is not understood.  
 
3. The Mind picks out one version of the wave function. The individual 
Mind concentrates on one version of the wave function of the brain-body, 
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and it is the concentrated-upon version that enters our conventional 
awareness.   
 
4. No collapse. The Mind does not collapse the wave function or interfere 
with the mathematics in any way.   
A primary objection to dualism—a non-physical Mind separate from 
a physical brain-body—is that the non-physical aspect must exert a 
force or otherwise have some effect on the physical world.  The 
Mind scheme circumvents this objection because the non-physical 
aspect only perceives; it does not affect the physical world (which is 
made up of wave functions) in any way. 
 
B. Agreement among Observers. 
The Overarching MIND. 
The model as it has been given so far leaves two important questions 
unanswered—why observers agree on what they perceive, and why the probability 
law holds.  To make the first question specific, consider again the Schrödinger’s cat 
experiment and suppose we have two observers.  Then according to the rules of 
quantum mechanics, the wave function is 
 
[cat alive] 
[obs 1’s brain state corresponds to cat alive] 
[obs 2’s brain state corresponds to cat alive] 
                                                           —and— 
[cat dead] 
[obs 1’s brain state corresponds to cat dead] 
[obs 2’s brain state corresponds to cat dead] 
 
Suppose observer 1’s Mind focuses on the version of the associated brain 
corresponding to cat alive so that observer 1 perceives, in the everyday sense, a live 
cat.  We know from everyday experience that observer 1 and observer 2 (and the 
cat) must be in agreement.  And we know from property [2-4] that two observers 
can never disagree.  But still, how do we guarantee in our Mind model, that 
observer 2’s Mind is also focused on the ‘alive’ version of its brain?  There is a 
way to bring about agreement but it is bound to make scientists even more skeptical 
of this proposal because it is far outside the realm of contemporary science. 
 
5. The overarching MIND. Instead of each individual Mind being separate 
from all others, each Mind is a fragment or facet of a single overarching 
MIND.  Each individual Mind is that aspect of MIND that is responsible for 
perceiving the state of the associated individual physical brain.  
Concentration of perception on a particular version of the wave function by 
one individual Mind is then presumed to set the concentration of perception 
on that same version by the overarching MIND.  And that in turn sets the 
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perception of the same version by all the other individual Minds.  Neither 
the MIND nor the individual Minds alter the wave function in any way.   
 
 So to obtain conscious agreement among observers in this scheme, we are 
forced to substitute the MIND assumption for the conventional particle or collapse 
assumptions that give a single-version physical world.  The scientist will say there 
is no evidence to justify such an outrageously non-scientific assumption.  But the 
counter-argument is that there is no evidence to justify the particle or collapse 
schemes either.  And if there is no collapse and there are no particles—the option 
we are exploring here—we are apparently forced to a “Mind” interpretation.  
Agreement among observers then forces us to the Mind-MIND scheme. 
 
 Freedom of choice.  Freedom of choice enters the Mind-MIND 
interpretation in the sense that the individual Mind can choose to perceive any 
possible internal quantum state—states in which the branches are branches of the 
brain wave function alone; that is, the freedom applies to thoughts and preparations 
for muscular actions.  (See appendix A11 for the argument that the brain has many 
simultaneously existing internal quantum states.)  But this freedom of choice of the 
individual Mind does not apply to external events, where the branching includes 
objects besides the brain.  We cannot choose to perceive a live Schrödinger’s cat 
instead of a dead one, nor can we choose to perceive a decayed nucleus instead of 
an undecayed one. 
 
C. The Probability Law. 
There is a problem with the concept of probability if we assume no particles 
and no collapse.  Probability as it is traditionally understood, say in the dice-rolling 
example, refers to the probability of a specific, actual, ‘single-version’ event; there 
is an actual die that has a specific reading after each roll.  But in quantum 
mechanics, the wave function does not give a specific, actual, single-version event; 
instead, it gives several versions of reality (equivalent to all six readings of the die 
occurring at the same time), each potentially corresponding to an ‘actual, 
perceived’ event.  So the direct use of classical probability is not appropriate in the 
Mind interpretation, where all versions exist forever.  (See also section 5.)   
In spite of this problem, there is a way to salvage the probability law in the 
Mind-MIND scheme.  To do this, we make the following (relatively weak) 
assumption: 
 
6. Probability. The overarching MIND is ‘much more likely’ to perceive a 
version of reality that has a much larger norm than other versions.  The 
MIND doesn’t have to follow the usual 2|)(| ia  probability law or any stable 
probability law at all; it just has to be much more likely to perceive those 
versions with a relatively large norm. 
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It is somewhat complicated to show how this leads to the 2|)(| ia  probability 
law, so the calculation is not done here.  See [1], section 11 and appendix A15.  But 
the important point is that, given assumption 6, the 2|)(| ia  probability law then 
follows from quantum mechanics itself, in agreement with principle [3-2] and the 
discussion following it. 
 
D. Related Thoughts. 
 Mindless hulks.  Mindless hulks are the unconscious versions—versions of 
the observer with no associated Mind.  But I don’t see them as a problem.  The 
‘enlivening’ principle in a being is the non-physical Mind.  When the Mind does 
not focus on a particular version of the observer, that version reverts to the same 
status as any other mindless object, such as a detector; it just evolves according to 
quantum mechanical laws.  The same is true, of course, for the ‘Minded’ version.  
But the Mind associated with the ‘Minded’ version keeps making decisions about 
which branch constitutes ‘reality,’ and that is what makes it alive.  The Mind is “the 
fire in the equations”.  (Actually it is the fire outside the equations.)  Note that we 
have no sentient beings (the version ‘inhabited’ by the Mind) talking to mindless 
hulks (the versions not inhabited) in the Mind-MIND interpretation because each 
individual Mind and the overarching MIND all concentrate on the same version. 
 
 The many-minds interpretation: In the many-minds interpretation of 
Albert and Loewer [29,30], which is a different attempt to avoid conscious versions 
talking to mindless hulks, there is a continuous infinity of minds associated with 
each observer.  Each of these non-quantum-mechanical minds chooses to perceive 
the wave function of the brain corresponding to one or the other branch at random, 
according to the 2|)(| ia  probability law.  And so, assuming our current perceptions 
correspond to those of one of the continuous infinity of minds, we would seem to 
arrive at the probability law—our perceptions are more likely to correspond to a 
state with large 2|)(| ia because more minds have chosen that state. 
 But I do not think that is correct.  Suppose we have a two-state system with 
8.|)2(|,2.|)1(| 22  aa .  There is a continuous infinity of minds that perceive each 
outcome.  But even though four minds choose state 2 for every one that chooses 
state 1, the same number of minds chooses each.  Why?  Because of the way 
infinities work; four times infinity is still just infinity.  Or to say it another way, 
there are the same number, 1 , of points on a line from 0 to .2 as there are on a line 
from .2 to 1.  Thus, because the ‘same number’ of minds perceives each possibility, 
the many-minds interpretation cannot account for the probability law.   
(Technically, it does not seem possible to set up a ‘measure’ when each of a 
continuous set of variables can take on several values, independent of the values of 
the other variables.) 
 Further, if my current awareness corresponds to a fraction 2.|)1(| 2a  of 
those minds from group A of minds and yours corresponds to a fraction 2.|)1(| 2a  
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of those minds from group B (with no coordination between group A minds and 
group B minds), then only a fraction .04 of the total minds choose state 1 (and a 
fraction .64 choose state 2).  This is not in accord with the probability law because 
you and I together would perceive state 1 on only 4% of the runs of the experiment.  
That is, if the choices of the minds from group B are independent of the choices of 
the minds from group A, then this scheme is not in accord with the probability law 
for entangled states.  To put it another way, the choice of state 1 from group A and 
state 2 from group B is not allowed, so choices for the minds corresponding to the 
two observers must be correlated (but they are not correlated in this model before 
observers 1 and 2 communicate).  The correlation is achieved through the MIND 
device in the Mind-MIND interpretation. 
 
 Panpsychism.  One potential solution to the problem of consciousness is to 
suppose that matter itself contains or carries intelligence and awareness.  But if 
physical reality consists of the wave function alone, with no collapse, this solution 
runs into difficulties.  Panpsychism, under these conditions, would seem to require 
that each version of a particle wave function has its own intelligence.  Further, the 
intelligences of the different versions would have to cooperate, in accord with the 
probability law, to somehow single out just one version (as required by the 
arguments of section 5) as the perceived version.  And the consciousness would 
have to be transferred from the single particle wave function to the detector wave 
function to the photons that are reflected by the detector to the brain of the 
observer.  This seems awkward.   
 
 Quantum Jumps. (“If we have to go on with these damned quantum 
jumps, then I’m sorry that I ever got involved.”  Schrödinger.)  Suppose one does a 
spin ½ Stern-Gerlach experiment (appendix A2).  Then it appears that the state 
jumps  from a quantum state in which the wave function is in both states to a 
quantum state in which the wave function is in only one state, say the + ½ state.  
But that is not true in the Mind-Mind interpretation; the quantum state remains a 
linear combination (no collapse) so there is no jump.  The only thing that is 
relevant is our perception of the quantum state; we perceive it in one state or 
another. 
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10. Summary. 
 
 In sections 2 through 7, we have given a number of principles that need to 
be taken into account in constructing a valid interpretive scheme for relating the 
mathematics of quantum mechanics to our perceptions.  And we have shown how 
these relate to various interpretations.  Here, we give the most important points in 
tabular form.  The left column represents basic principles and the right column, 
consequences. 
 
     Each version of reality  
     is in a separate universe. 
 
Linearity.    There is a version of the observer 
     in each potential version of reality. 
Many versions 
of reality.    We perceive only one 
     version of reality. 
 
     One version of reality always 
     matches our perceptions. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
One quantum version always  
matches our perceptions. 
 
‘Separate universes’ 
implies localization. 
 
Group representation theory  No evidence 
implies mass, charge, etc.  for particles. 
belong to the wave function. 
 
Small parts of the wave 
function carry the full  
energy and momentum. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Linearity, unreasonable  No evidence 
interactions, unfruitful   for collapse. 
experimental search. 
••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
     The many-worlds interpretation  
The probability law.   cannot accommodate probability 
     so it is not valid. 
 35 
 Now, given the principles and the current state of physics, we list our ‘most 
reasonable’ constraints on an interpretation.  The Mind-MIND interpretation is one 
way to satisfy all these constraints.  In that interpretation, each individual has an 
associated Mind, outside the laws of quantum mechanics, which perceives just one 
version of the individual’s brain wave function.  And each individual Mind is an 
aspect of a single over-arching MIND.  This interpretation has the bonus that, with 
one additional weak assumption, the probability law is automatically satisfied, in 
accord with principle [3-2] and the ensuing discussion. 
 
One quantum version always  
matches our perceptions. 
 
No particles or 
hidden variables; 
only the wave function.   
     The Mind-MIND Probability is a conse-  
No collapse, mathematical or  interpretation. quence, not an input. 
perceptual, so the Schrödinger      
equation always holds.    
      
One version is singled out    
(required by the probability law). 
 
Communicating versions of two 
observers must be on an equal par. 
 
 
 
 
 36 
Appendices. 
 
A1. The Polarization of Photons. 
 
 A photon is the name given to a ‘piece’ of light.  In this treatment, where it 
is assumed (see section 6) there are no particles, it refers to a wave function with 
mass 0, spin 1, and charge 0.  Each photon (wave function) travels at the speed of 
light.  If it has wavelength  , its energy is /hc  and its momentum is /h  where 
c is the speed of light and  h is Planck’s constant. 
 
 Each photon has two possible states of polarization, which is analogous to 
spin or angular momentum.  This can be visualized in the following way:  A photon 
can be thought of (at least classically) as consisting of oscillating electric and 
magnetic fields.  If a photon is traveling in the z direction, its electric field can 
either oscillate in the x direction, so the photon is represented by x| , or its electric 
field can be oscillating in the y direction, so it is represented by y| .  These are the 
two states of polarization. 
 
 It can also be polarized so its electric field oscillates in any direction, say at 
an angle   to the x axis.  In that case, the photon state can be represented as a 
(linear) combination of the x|  and y| , 
 
 yxph |sin|cos,|                                       (A1-1) 
 
There are certain materials (such as Polaroid) that act as filters in that they let 
through only that part of the photon polarized in a certain direction.  In terms of the 
wave function, if we have a polarizer ],[ xP that lets through only x|  photons, then 
 
 xxPph |cos],[,|                                           (A1-2) 
 
 What this translates into experimentally is the following: Suppose we have 
a beam of light that contains N photons in state (A1-1) crossing a given plane per 
sec, each moving at the speed of light.  Then a 100% efficient detector put in the 
beam will record N ‘hits’ per second.  But if we put an x polarizer in the beam, the 
detector will record only 2cosN  hits per second.  And if we put in a y polarizer, 
the detector will record only 2sinN  hits per second. 
 
 Thus the polarization state of Eq. (A1-1) acts as if it were composed of both 
a photon polarized in the x direction and a photon polarized in the y direction.  But 
if we measure, we find an x|  photon on a fraction 2cos  of the measurements 
and a y| photon on a fraction 2sin  of the measurements.  Not so easy to 
understand! 
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 There are crystals that can separate the photon into its x and y polarization 
parts, so that the x polarized part travels on one path and the y polarized part travels 
on another path.  One can put a detector in each path, and one can have an observer 
that looks at each detector.  If we send a single photon, in state (A1-1), through this 
apparatus, the wave function of the two detectors plus the observer is still a sum of 
just two terms: 
 


yesynoxObsyesyDetnoxDetx
noyyesxObsnoyDetyesxDetxstate
;,|,|,||sin
;,|,|,||cos|


        (A1-3) 
 
But now the whole ‘universe,’ photon, detectors and observer, has split into two 
states.  In particular, if you are the observer, there are two states of you!  On a 
fraction 2cos  of the runs, the “x, yes; y, no” version will correspond to your 
perceptions and on a fraction 2sin  of the runs the “x, no; y, yes” version will 
correspond to your perceptions.  On a given run, quantum mechanics does not say 
which version will correspond to your perceptions.  So this experiment and the 
state of Eq. (A1-3) give another example of quantum mechanics presenting us with 
more than one version of reality—one version of you perceiving polarization x and, 
at the same time, another version of you perceiving polarization y. 
 
 
 
A2. Spin and the Stern-Gerlach Experiment. 
 
 Discrete values of angular momentum, or spin as it is called on the atomic 
level, are one of the hallmarks of quantum mechanics.  And the Stern-Gerlach 
experiment, used to measure spin, is one of the most-used examples for illustrating 
ideas in quantum mechanics.  So it seems useful to gather all the relevant ideas in 
one place. 
 
 The invariance chain of reasoning. As we noted in section 6, rotations of 
the whole apparatus do not affect the outcome of experiments.  This implies the 
equations must have the same form in all rotated coordinate systems.  This form 
invariance in turn implies that solutions of the equation can be labeled by spin or 
angular momentum.  And we further find that the spin, even though it is initially 
just a label on a solution, can actually be measured, so that the labels have physical 
meaning.  That is, we have this chain of reasoning—from physical invariance 
(rotations shouldn’t matter in the outcome) to mathematical invariance to a 
mathematical classification scheme for different wave functions to an actual, 
physical, measurable property of the wave function. 
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 Classical and quantum angular momentum. Angular momentum was 
defined in classical physics centuries ago; it is the ‘momentum around the center’ 
(momentum times the radius) a ‘particle’ has when traveling in a circle.  This could 
take on any value so that classically, angular momentum is a continuous variable. 
 But that is not true in quantum mechanics.  Instead, when measured along a 
certain direction, angular momentum (spin) can only take on certain discrete 
values.  For a spin 1 wave function, the allowed values (in units of the Planck 
constant  ) are 1,0,-1.  For a spin 2 wave function, they are 2,1,0,-1,-2, and so on.  
This quantization (only a discrete number of values allowed, instead of a 
continuum) of angular momentum is one of the primary characteristics of quantum 
mechanics. 
 
 The Stern-Gerlach experiment. Angular momentum or spin is measured 
on an atomic scale by the Stern-Gerlach experiment.  A particle (particle-like wave 
function) is shot into a magnetic field and the field exerts different forces on the 
parts of the wave functions having different values of spin.  Because of the 
differing forces, the parts of the wave function with different spin exit the magnetic 
field traveling in slightly different directions.  Suppose, for example, that a spin 1 
particle is shot into the magnetic field.  Then three different streams of particles 
will come out of the apparatus; the +1 spin might be traveling slightly upward, the 
spin 0 would travel straight through, and the -1 spin would be travelling slightly 
downward.  Three different detectors could be put in the three paths to determine 
which path the particle took (this ‘particle’ and ‘which path’ language is convenient 
but misleading). 
 
 Many versions of reality. So let’s suppose the wave function for the 
particle before it reaches the magnetic field is a linear combination of the three 
possible spins, 
 
)(1|)1()(0|)0()(1|)1(| xaxaxabefore            (A2-1) 
 
where the kets, |  indicate the spin part of the wave function and the )(x  
represents the spatial part of the wave function (the same for all three here).  After 
the particle goes through the magnetic field, the wave function becomes 
 
)(1|)1()(0|)0()(1|)1(| 101 xaxaxaafter           (A2-2) 
 
where the subscripts indicate the three different spatial parts of the wave function 
take three different paths. 
 We now put a detector on each of the paths, and suppose there is an 
observer looking at the outcome (yes or no) displayed on each dial.  The full wave 
function, particle plus detectors plus observer, is then the sum of three parts; 
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





yesnonoObsyesDnoDnoDxa
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where the a’s are the ‘sizes’ of each option.  So we see that the final state contains 
three separate versions of reality.  In particular, there are three versions of the 
observer, each perceiving a different result.  One and only one of the versions will 
correspond to what we, as ‘the’ observer, perceive, but quantum mechanics does 
not say which one.  (But it does say that if the experiment is repeated many times, 
the +1 result will be observed on a fraction 2|)1(| a  of the runs, and similarly for 0 
and -1.) 
 
 Spin ½ . There is one more intriguing point about angular momentum in 
quantum mechanics.  For the hydrogen atom, the mathematics predicts that the 
total angular momentum can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,… and so on, with, respectively, 1, 3, 
5, 7… components when measured along some axis.  That is, there are an odd 
number of components (different states, different number of trajectories after the 
magnetic field).  But when Stern and Gerlach measured the angular momenta of 
silver atoms, they found only two components, corresponding to an angular 
momentum of ½ (with allowed values + ½ and – ½ )!   This, in fact, was how spin 
½ was discovered. 
 Interestingly, the abstract group representational theory (with ‘abstract’ here 
meaning not associated with a particular problem) allows the observed spin ½, even 
though it does not occur in the hydrogen atom case.  This may have theoretical 
implications (see section 6A, Significance,…, III, and reference [11]).  Odd half 
integer spin particles ( 1/2, 3/2,…), known collectively as fermions, behave quite 
differently in certain situations from integer spin particles (0,1,2,…), known 
collectively as bosons. 
 
 
A3. Classical Consistency of Observations 
in Quantum Mechanics. 
 
 We will show here that quantum mechanics agrees with our perception of a 
seemingly classical world.  The main ideas are that only versions of the observer 
perceive, and that the versions of reality, including the versions of the observers, 
are in isolated, non-communicating universes. 
 
 To illustrate the principles, we consider an experiment on an atomic 
system with K states, k|  .  There is an apparatus, denoted by A| and an observer 
denoted by O| .  After the experiment is done, the state is 
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
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1
|||                                      (A3-1) 
 
Before the experiment starts, we tell the observer to write down “k, classical” if 
they see  a version of reality corresponding to the classical state k. just one version 
of reality, and “other” if they perceive anything else (such as a “double exposure”).  
We see from Eq. (A3-1) that each version kO| of the observer perceives only the 
kth outcome, so version k will write down “k, classical;”  
 

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kkk classicalkOAka
1
),(||| .                                  (A3-2) 
 
“Other” is never written.  Even if we switch bases, so that each version of the 
observer is a linear combination of the kO| ,  “other” will never be written because 
kO| in the linear combinations is always ),1(| classicalOk .  And since “other” is 
never written, it must never be perceived.  Thus 
 
[2-6]. Perception of more than one outcome of an experiment by an 
observer can never occur within quantum mechanics. 
 
This result would seem to imply that the ‘preferred basis’ problem is a red herring, 
of no real importance. 
 
 Next we consider principle [2-9], on the agreement of observers. We ask 
two observers to write down their perceptions and then ask the second observer to 
look at the first observer’s result and write “agree” or “disagree.”  The resulting 
state is 
 

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)1(                            (A3-3) 
 
Thus “disagree” is never written, so 
 
[2-9] Quantum mechanics implies that two observers can never disagree on 
what they perceive. 
 
 We now consider principle [2-7].  We start from state (A3-1) and have the 
observer look twice at the dial.  Then we have state 
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1
),(|||                                     (A3-4) 
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Thus we see we never have ),(| jkO  so that an observer never has conflicting 
observations: 
 
[2-7] If two observations of a single result are made successively, quantum 
mechanics implies the same consistency of results as one obtains in a 
classical universe. 
 
The same argument would apply if one did multiple experiments; results are always 
consistent within a version, and versions of the observer cannot ‘see’ from one 
isolated universe to another.   That is, because the interactions are local and 
separable, a cause in the past can never produce a classically inconsistent effect in 
the future within a version.  So each version of the observer perceives a classical 
cause and effect universe. 
 
 Finally, we separately consider principle [2-8], on the consistency of 
successive measurements.  As an example, we might have a spin ½ Stern-Gerlach 
experiment that yields two different possible trajectories for the particles exiting the 
apparatus.  We then put a second Stern-Gerlach experiment in each exit beam to re-
measure the z-component of spin.  We will find that we get consistent results, both 
experimentally and quantum mechanically. 
 To actually write out the states to show this is a notational nightmare, so we 
will talk it through.  We suppose there is a device, M , that splits the beam of 
incoming particles into N different trajectories, and on each trajectory, there is a 
readout, R, that says no (no detection) or yes (detection).  Then on each of the N 
possible trajectories, we put a similar device, M  plus a similar readout.  We 
designate the state of the apparatus before the experiment by a 0 subscript.  Then 
for any of the 1N  sets of apparatus, we have 
 
  kkk RkMaRMka |||| 0                                    (A3-5) 
 
and hence for the special case jkaa kj  ,0,1  
 
 jRjMRMj |||| 0                                            (A3-6) 
 
where there is no sum in Eq. (A3-6). 
 Now we do the compound experiment.  After the first apparatus, there will 
be N versions of reality.  In version k, there will be the particle state, k| , plus a 
readout that says k yes, all others no.  When the particle state k|  hits the second 
apparatus, because of Eq. (A3-6), that apparatus will also register k yes, all others 
no.  Thus the second measurement must agree with the first, even if there is no 
collapse or no actual particle in a certain state.  And so we have 
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[2-8] If one measures the same property twice in a row, quantum mechanics 
implies one will get the same result. 
 
 In summary, the perceptions of ‘the observer’ in quantum mechanics will 
never disagree with what is expected classically.  (So the only problem with 
quantum mechanics is that we don’t know which version of reality will pop up.)   
 
 
A4. Problems with Probability in QMA. 
 
 The probability law is about the probability of perceiving a given version of 
reality.  In section 5, we argued that there could be no probability of perception in 
QMA (no particles, no collapse, no sentient beings) because (1) only versions of 
the observer perceive and (2) each version of the observer perceives its associated 
version of reality with 100% probability.  Thus there is no probability of perception 
and no coefficient-dependence of perception in QMA, so the 2|)(| ia  probability 
law is not inherent in the rules governing QMA.   
 
Correlation between the coefficients and our perceptions.  By looking at 
a particular case, we can see the problem with probability in QMA from a different 
and perhaps more compelling perspective.  Suppose we consider a two-state 
system,  
 
 2|1| 21 aa ,                                                   (A4-1) 
 
with 0001.||,9999.|| 22
2
1  aa , and suppose we do ten runs, with the observer 
perceiving the results of every run.  There will be 024,1210   possible outcomes 
and 1,024 versions of the observer.   
 Now we know that each of these versions is equally valid (that is, of equal 
perceptual status) in the sense that (1) each has a valid version of the brain wave 
function and (2) each version is, within QMA, equally aware ([1], appendix A6).  
But we know experientially that my perceptions will (almost always) correspond to 
only one of them, the one with all ten outcomes 1.  That is, one version from 
among all the 1,024 versions is (almost always) singled-out as the one 
corresponding to my experiential perceptions.  Conversely, my perceptions never 
correspond to one of the 252 versions of the observer that perceives five outcomes 
2.   
 Thus there is a correlation between the coefficients and my perceptions, a 
correlation which cannot be deduced from the tenets of QMA (because perception 
has no coefficient-dependent or probabilistic characteristics in QMA).  Something 
outside QMA must be responsible for this correlation. 
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 Adding the probability law as an assumption?  Suppose we try an 
interpretation, QMB, which consists of QMA plus the assumption that the 
probability law holds.  This is an allowable interpretation, but it is, in my opinion, 
unsatisfactory.  Why?  Because there must be some ‘mechanism,’ outside QMA, 
which is responsible for the correlation, but the simple assumption says nothing 
about the mechanism.  The assumption says, in effect, that the perception-
coefficient correlation is simply a law of nature.   
 It seems to me, however, that an interpretation is incomplete if it doesn’t 
specify the mechanism responsible for the correlation.  It seems appropriate to 
require that a completely satisfactory interpretation explain why our perceptions 
never correspond to those states with very small amplitudes.  Just saying it’s a law 
of nature leaves the central mystery unexplained.  It’s like saying the wavelengths 
of light emitted by hydrogen atoms follow a regular pattern simply because it’s a 
law of nature, rather than looking for an underlying explanation.   
 So I view QMB as only a temporary, unsatisfying interpretation which we 
use until we understand the cause of the perception-amplitude correlation. 
 
 Singling out.  The above reasoning shows that there is a correlation 
between the coefficients and my perceptions.  This would almost certainly seem to 
imply that one version of the observer is singled out as the one whose perceptions 
correspond to mine.  This in turn implies there is a unique me (instead of the many 
versions of me in QMA).  Because no version is singled out in QMA, there must be 
some non-QMA ‘mechanism’ at work here (see section 9). 
 
 
A5. The Double-Slit Experiment. 
 
 The double-slit experiment is of interest because it illustrates both the wave-
like property of interference and the particle-like property of localization.  But it 
does not provide evidence for the existence of particles. 
 
Interference. We start with interference.  When you have a wave, 
something oscillates.  In a water wave, the height of the water oscillates up and 
down about some average level.  In a sound wave, the density of the air oscillates, 
in the same direction as the wave.  In a (classical) light wave, the electric and 
magnetic fields oscillate (see appendix A1).  In each case, there is a peak in a wave 
followed by a trough.  The ‘height’ of the wave, the maximum amount above or 
below average, is called the amplitude. 
 Suppose now we consider a light wave going through the two slits.  After 
going through the two slits, the two waves spread out (diffraction) and hit a screen 
covered with film grains.  If we let x be the distance to the right from the midpoint 
of the screen, a small part of each wave hitting near point x.  But the wave from the 
left slit has traveled farther than the wave from the right slit, so the two waves will 
be ‘out of phase.’  If the upper wave has traveled half a wavelength farther, then 
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when a peak from that wave hits near x, a trough from the lower wave will hit near 
x.  But the trough (below average) will just cancel out the peak (above average) and 
so the net disturbance near x will be zero.  This is destructive interference.   
On the other hand, if the upper wave has traveled a full wavelength farther, 
peaks from both waves will simultaneously hit near point x, so the net disturbance 
will be a maximum—constructive interference.  Thus the ‘disturbance’ at the 
screen as point x moves from the center towards the edge of the screen will go 
through maxima and minima.  If the wave is a water wave, the waves from the two 
sources will produce a wave of maximum height at each constructive interference 
points but it will produce no wave at all at the destructive interference points. 
If the wave is a light wave and the screen is covered with grains of film, the 
density of exposed grains will be a maximum at the constructive interference points 
but there will be no grains exposed near the destructive interference points. 
 
 Quantum considerations.  Suppose now, instead of considering a beam of 
light, which contains many photons (photon-like wave functions) we consider the 
wave function of just one photon.  Then after the wave function goes through the 
two slits, it will produce a constructive-destructive interference pattern.  But now, if 
we do a microscopic examination of all the film grains, we find that just one is 
exposed!  That is, the interference pattern of the wave does not translate into an 
interference pattern on the screen.  Instead, the interference pattern corresponds to a 
probability wave; the one exposed grain is more likely to be found near the 
maxima, and will never be found at the minima. 
 
 The particle interpretation.  If one assumes there are particles, then the 
interpretation of the above results is that the particle goes through one slit or the 
other, and is then ‘guided’ by the probability wave generally towards the maxima.  
And when the particle hits a single grain, it is that grain which is exposed. 
 
 The no-particle interpretation.  The no-particle interpretation exactly 
follows the localization analysis of section 6B.  The (uncollapsed) wave function 
contains many versions of reality, each with one exposed grain, but we perceive 
just one of these versions of reality (in accordance with the probability law).  All 
versions continue to ‘exist’, but just one version—with just one grain exposed—
enters our perception. 
 
 
A6. Bell’s Theorem and Non-Locality. 
 
 In 1964, Bell [7] proved that if all the information regarding a particle-like 
state was contained locally, say within a centimeter of the localized wave function, 
then there would be a conflict with quantum mechanics.  In particular, he showed 
that if two particles, electrons or photons, were initially in a spin 0 state which split 
into two single-particle states that moved away from each other, there would be 
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correlations between the two measured spin states that would be different from 
what quantum mechanics predicted.  This experiment has been done by Aspect [8] 
and others, and it was found that the quantum mechanical laws were obeyed.  Thus 
we have a proof that there can be no local hidden variable theories. 
 
 In interpreting the results of this experiment, it is often assumed there are 
(localized) particles.  Under that assumption, one needs instantaneous long-range 
signaling between the particles to account for the non-local correlations in the 
Aspect experiment.  But if there are no particles, which is our view (see section 6), 
there is no need for signaling; it is just quantum mechanics as usual, with its 
inherent non-locality.   
 
│ Non-locality via the wave function.  With all due respect to Bell—
│he started a major line of inquiry in quantum mechanics—it seems to me 
│that one could reasonably expect hidden variable theories to be non-local, 
│in contrast to Bell’s assumption.  First, one knows that the wave functions 
│of quantum mechanics contain non-local information; the Aspect 
│experiment and theory tell us that.  Second, we see from the Bohm hidden 
│variable model (section 6) that the hidden variables can depend locally on 
│the wave function (velocities are derivatives of the local phase angle of 
│the wave function).  So one could imagine a hidden variable theory in 
│which there is indirect non-locality; each of the hidden variable sets for 
│the two particle-like states takes its information locally from the wave 
│function.  But because the wave function contains non-local information, 
│the conditions for Bell’s theorem no longer apply.  Thus there are 
│reasonable objections to Bell’s locality assumption for hidden variable 
│theories. 
 
 Correlations vs. ‘influence.’  On the surface, it looks like the measurement 
on one ‘particle’ influences the state of the distant ‘particle.’  But if there are no 
particles, and if there is no collapse, then detection of the state of one particle-like 
wave function does not in any way affect or influence the quantum state of the 
second, distant particle-like wave function.  All we can say is there is a correlation 
between the measurements on the two distant particle-like wave functions. 
 
 
 
A7. The Wheeler Delayed-Choice Experiment. 
 
 A Mach-Zehnder interferometer is set up so that a light wave is divided by a 
half-silvered mirror and travels on two different paths.  After the photon-like wave 
function has been divided but before it is detected, the detector at the end of the 
interferometer is rapidly adjusted to one of two possible settings.  If particulate 
photons exist, then the measured results from the two different settings depend on 
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which path the conjectured particulate photon took.  Under this assumption, the 
experimental results show that the conjectured photon made a choice of path after it 
had passed the point where the paths divide—a violation of our intuitive 
understanding of causality.   
 If, however, one assumes only the wave function exists (no particulate 
photons), then quantum mechanics, as it is, gives the correct answer, with no after-
the-fact choice involved.  That is, the assumption of the existence of particles gets 
us in causality trouble, but no-particle quantum mechanics does not.  So I would 
take the results of the Wheeler delayed-choice experiment [9,10] as more evidence 
(in addition to that of section 6) for no particles rather than as causality operating 
backwards in time (from the later time when the detector setting was changed, with 
the photon was halfway to the second mirror, to the earlier time when the photon 
had not yet passed the first mirror). 
 
 
 
A8.  The Quantum Eraser Experiment. 
 
 The aim of this set of experiments [11,12] is similar to that of the Wheeler 
delayed-choice experiment in that if one assumes the existence of particles, then 
one gets into causality—and locality—troubles.  Before explaining the 
experiments, we should say that no-particle quantum mechanics gives results in 
agreement with the experiments.  So our view is that, as in the Wheeler delayed-
choice experiment, one is using an unsupported idea—particles—to derive 
seemingly surprising results. 
 
 Experiment 1. The experiment uses two entangled photons, originally in a 
spin 0 state, that fly apart from each other.  If one photon has polarization in the x-
direction, then the other has polarization in the y-direction, no matter what 
orientation is chosen for the x and y axes.  In this first experiment, photon 1 goes 
through a double slit and is then detected on a screen while photon 2 is simply 
detected.  The results are not surprising; when the experiment is run many times, 
one gets the usual double-slit interference pattern on the photon 1 screen. 
 
 Experiment 2. The light from the two slits in photon 1’s path are put 
through special crystals that tinker with the polarization so that the polarization of 
the light that goes through one slit is completely different from the polarization of 
the light that goes through the other slit.  In that case, the light from the two 
different slits cannot interfere, so one gets a single-slit interference pattern on the 
screen. 
 
 Experiment 3.  The light from photon 2 (which doesn’t go through the 
double slit) is now polarized and detected.  The polarization of the second photon 
(according to quantum mechanics) has an effect on the first photon; the crystals in 
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front of the two slits no longer give different polarizations to the light from the two 
different slits.  Thus the two beams interfere and one again gets a double-slit 
interference pattern spread out over the screen. 
 From the particle point of view, this seems remarkable.  The experimental 
arrangement for photon 1 was not changed from experiment 2 and yet the results 
for photon 1 are different from those of experiment 2.  A change in particle 2 
affects the results for particle 1. 
 
 Experiment 4.  Same experimental setup as in experiment 3 except that the 
polarizer and the detector for photon 2 are moved far away, so photon 1 is detected 
before photon 2.  One still gets a double-slit interference pattern.  (But if photon 2 
were not detected, or if it were detected as in experiment 2, one would get a single-
slit pattern.) 
 Again from a certain point of view, this is saying that the state of particle 2, 
determined only after particle 1 is detected, retroactively affects the trajectory of 
distant particle 1.  That is, causality appears to work backwards in time. 
  
 Quantum mechanical correlation explanation.  In all the experiments, 
there is a coincidence circuit that accepts only those results where both detector 1 
and detector 2 register a photon (within a certain time frame).  So in experiments 3 
and 4, one is measuring the pattern made by many 1 photons given that photon 2 
has a certain polarization.  If the polarizer for photon 2 were rotated 90 degrees, 
one would still get a double-slit interference pattern, but if the two double-slit 
interference patterns for 1 ( from 0 degrees and 90 degrees) were superimposed, 
they would just give the single-slit pattern of experiment 2!  Thus the polarizer in 
path 2, plus the coincidence counter, effectively selects for a certain set of 1 
photons and these give the double-slit pattern even though the set of all 1 photons 
gives the single-slit pattern.   
 If one postulates particles, and if one requires that each particle be in a 
definite state at each instant, then experiment 3 seems to require action-at-a-
distance between the two particles.  And experiment 4 seems to require retroactive 
action-at-a-distance.  But if one postulates no-particle quantum mechanics, the 
experiments simply verify the correlations predicted by quantum mechanics 
between the two entangled photon-like wave functions. 
 This is a summary of the write-up at .grad.physics.sunysb.edu/~amarch 
which is best reached by Googling “quantum eraser.” 
 
 
A9. Collapse by Conscious Perception. 
 
 To illustrate the difficulties facing the proposal of collapse by conscious 
perception, we will look at a Stern-Gerlach experiment on a spin ½ silver atom.  
There is a detector on the trajectory of the – ½ branch but none on the trajectory of 
the + ½ branch, with the detector reading “yes” for detection and “no” for no 
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detection.  Suppose the observer is initially gazing off into space and then, a couple 
of seconds after the silver atom passes the detector, she focuses her attention on the 
detector.   
 Presumably, for an instant, there are two versions of the observer, 
perceiving both the yes and the no branches.  In this instant, there must be 
something—we will call it a ‘Mind’—outside quantum mechanics, which realizes 
‘the observer’ is perceiving a multi-version reality.  That is, the ‘Mind’ must 
somehow become aware that there are two separate versions of the observer’s brain 
wave function.  And then, in the next instant, the ‘Mind’ collapses the wave 
function to just one option. 
 
 There are three problems with this presumption.  They do not rule it out, but 
they still need to be addressed.  The first is that conscious perception—focusing the 
eyes on the dial in this case—is a complicated neural process.  So it is not clear at 
what point in that process the ‘Mind,’ perceiving the state of the brain, knows there 
are two versions. 
 For the second problem, suppose the observer focuses on the dial the whole 
time, from before the atom is shot through the apparatus to after it passes the 
detector.  And suppose the final result is that the detector is perceived as continuing 
to read no, so there is, in the conventional sense, no change in the dial reading from 
beginning to end.  In that case, the observer has not consciously (in the 
conventional sense) perceived anything that could have cued the collapse.  This 
implies the definition of ‘conscious perception’ must be amended from its 
conventional meaning to accommodate collapse by ‘conscious perception’.  It also 
implies, as indicated above, that the ‘Mind’ is perceiving more than one version. 
 To illustrate the third problem, we again use a Stern-Gelach experiment, 
with detectors on both branches.  The state is 
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                                                                                                                       (A9-1) 
 
Now each version of the observer’s brain is independent of the coefficients; for 
example, the neural firing pattern for each version does not depend on )2/1(a  or 
)2/1(a .  However, the ‘Mind’ must collapse the wave function in accord with the 
2|)(| ia  probability law, so the ‘Mind’ must have access to the values of those 
coefficients.  But it is not possible to get those values strictly from the wave 
function of the observer’s brain, so some process must be proposed for how the 
‘Mind’ ‘senses’ the value of the coefficients.  This observation virtually guarantees 
that the collapsing ‘Mind’ must perceive more than just the wave function of the 
individual brain.  To obtain information on the coefficients, it must apparently 
perceive, not just the wave function of the brain, but the whole wave function, 
including those of the detectors. 
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A10. The Uncertainty Principle 
 
 The uncertainty principle has a technical statement and derivation along 
with an interpretation or explanation of what the technical statement implies.  To 
illustrate, suppose we have either a light-like wave function or an electron-like 
wave function that goes through a narrow slit.  The particle-like wave function is 
initially traveling in the z direction and the slit is in the y direction.  After the wave 
goes through the slit, it spreads out in the x-direction.  Because of this, if one 
measures the x position many times, one will get a spread in values, even if the 
measurements are exact.  This is just the nature of waves.  The same conclusion 
holds for momentum.  If one measures the momentum in the x direction, one will 
get a spread in values, even if the measurements are exact.   
 
It is remarkable that, by the use of standard vector-space arguments, one can 
get a relation between the spreads in position and momentum.  It is: 
 
                                          4\)()( 222  xxpp xx                           (A10-1)                 
 
(where the   comes from the fact that ixpx ],[ ).  Or, if we take the square root 
of this relation and use root-mean-square quantities, 
 
                                                2/)()(  rmsrmsx xp                                      (A10-2) 
 
 This relation is often interpreted as follows:  There exists a particle 
embedded in the wave function whose position and momentum cannot be 
simultaneously measured exactly.  But we have seen that there is no evidence for 
particles, so this interpretation is not warranted.  The only thing the uncertainty 
principle tells us is that if we make many measurements of position and then, on 
separate runs of the experiment we make many measurements of momentum, the 
product of the rms spreads of the two quantities must be greater than 2/ .  Again, 
this result is simply a consequence of the nature of waves.  If there are no particles, 
it is not so mysterious. 
 
 Another way the uncertainty principle is often used is to say that if the wave 
function is confined to a very small region in space, it will have a large spread in 
momentum.  This is a valid translation of the import of equations A10-1 and A10-
2. 
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A11. Spread of the Wave Packet. 
Application to Brain Processes. 
 
 The question is whether quantum mechanics is relevant in the brain.  The 
primary dynamics of the brain is that there is an electrochemical pulse which 
travels from one end of a neuron to another.  The propagation of this pulse is 
classical; quantum mechanics is irrelevant here (as far as we currently know).  But 
the initiation of pulses makes use of the synapses, the small separations between 
adjacent neurons, and these synapses are small enough—less than a thousand atoms 
or 100 nm across—that quantum processes are potentially relevant.  In fact, using 
an argument due to Stapp [18], we can show that quantum considerations are 
almost certainly relevant for neural processes. 
 
 Synapses and calcium ions. The synapses determine whether or not a pulse 
in one neuron triggers a pulse in the next neuron, and so they control the flow of 
thoughts.  The passing-on or not-passing-on is in turn partly controlled by calcium 
ions.  Classically and simplistically speaking, if a calcium ion is near that edge of a 
synapse which is next to the synapse of another neuron, •) (, the pulse will be 
passed on.  That is, the positions of the calcium ions, in effect, control the flow of 
thoughts. 
 Now the wave function of a calcium ion (or any particle) doesn’t just sit, 
unmoving, in space; it spreads out.  So one way that quantum mechanics can be 
relevant to the brain is if a single calcium ion spreads out over the whole synapse in 
a reasonable time.  If it does, within a time appropriate for neural processes, then 
the quantum state of the synapse will be a linear combination of [passing on] 
(calcium ion near the edge) and [not passing on] (calcium ion not near the edge) the 
electrochemical pulse.  In that case, quantum mechanical considerations are indeed 
relevant to the functioning of the brain. 
 
 The spread of calcium ions. So the question becomes: Do calcium ions 
spread out over the synapse in the time, approximately 1 millisecond, relevant to 
neural processes?  To see, we use the uncertainty principle 
 
 px                                                     (A11-1) 
 
Suppose we have a calcium atom initially centered at the origin and use 
 
dtmdxmvpxx /,                                     (A11-2) 
 
From these two equations, we get 
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                     (A11-3) 
 
where 0x is the initial spread in the wave function and t is the time of spread. 
 
 A reasonable initial spread for the wave packet is 10 nm, and a conservative 
representative time for brain processes is a tenth of a millisecond.  We also have 
3410  and 271066  xmCa  in mks units.  If we put these numbers in, we get 
500spreadx nm, which is more than adequate for the calcium ion to spread around 
the synapse.   
 The conclusion is: Because the wave function for a single calcium ion 
quickly spreads around the synapse, the quantum state of the synapse is a linear 
combination of passing on and not passing on the pulse.  Thus quantum mechanical 
considerations certainly cannot be ruled out for brain processes. 
 
 Free will. Templates.  There is a book [31] by the Nobel laureate brain 
researcher John Eccles called “How the SELF Controls Its BRAIN.”  Because of the 
spread of the calcium wave packets, the wave function of the brain is a linear 
combination of trillions of different possible thoughts and signals for bodily 
actions.  The Mind, if one subscribes to that interpretation, can ‘freely’ ‘control’ the 
thoughts and actions by choosing one of those neural states to concentrate on.  But 
the organizational problem, how to pick out just the right combination of firing 
neurons to cause a particular thought or bodily movement, is formidable.  It must 
presumably be solved by some combination of the structure of the physical brain 
along with a set of organizational templates that are indigenous to the ‘non-
physical’ Mind. 
 
 
A12. Quarks. Elementary Particle Systematics. 
 
 Over the last few decades, the list of ‘elementary’ particles has grown from 
a few—electrons, neutrinos, protons, neutrons, photons—to several dozen.  The 
question then becomes whether all these particles are really just combinations of 
some small set of ‘most elementary’ particles.  A good deal of progress has been 
made on answering this question in the affirmative and we will briefly describe the 
resulting scheme here.  (Note: ‘Particle’ here is shorthand for ‘particle-like wave 
function.’) 
 
 Fermions and bosons.  First, particles divide into two general groups, 
depending on their spin.  Fermions have spin 1/2, 3/2, …, and bosons have spin 0, 
1, 2, … 
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 Three forces, three charges.  Historically, the first charge was the electric 
charge, associated with the electromagnetic force, the force that holds atoms 
together.  Now there is also a ‘weak’ charge associated with the weak force that 
causes nuclear decay and creates neutrinos, .  And there is a ‘strong’ charge, 
associated with the strong quark-quark forces that hold protons, neutrons and nuclei 
together. 
 
 Quarks. Color.  Fermions divide into two general groups, with the lighter 
ones (smaller mass) called leptons and the heavier ones baryons.  All leptons have 
strong charge zero.  All baryons contain quarks, which have strong charge 1.  No 
one has ever seen an isolated quark; all the particles we can detect are composed of 
either three quarks or of a quark and an anti-quark bound together.  Each quark 
comes in three ‘colors,’ (an arbitrary designation) say red, yellow and blue.  Their 
existence is inferred from the systematics and force properties of the baryons.  
 
 Generations of fermions. The fermions fall into three generations of 
particles.  All three generations have exactly the same charges and force properties, 
but they have successively higher masses. 
 
First generation:  
 Up and down quarks, electron, and electron neutrino. 
Second generation:  
Strange and charmed quarks, muon (a fat electron), and muon 
neutrino. 
Third generation:  
 Bottom and top quarks, tau (a very fat electron), and tau neutrino. 
 
Each quark comes in three colors. 
Only the first generation occurs in ‘everyday’ situations. 
The neutrinos were originally thought to have zero mass, but are now 
presumed to have very small masses. 
 
 The up quark has electromagnetic charge of +2/3 while the down quark has 
charge -1/3.  A proton is composed of two up quarks and one down quark while a 
neutron is composed of two downs and one up. 
 
 Antiparticles.  Each of the fermions has an antiparticle.  It has the same 
mass as the original particle but opposite charges.  A particle and its antiparticle 
can annihilate, leaving only vector bosons.  For example, an electron and a positron 
can annihilate each other, leaving only two photons.  
 
 Interaction-mediating vector bosons.  The fermions (electrons and so on) 
interact in a peculiar way.  One fermion will create a spin 1 (vector) boson (why 
this happens is not understood), the boson will travel through space, and then 
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annihilate at another fermion, transferring energy and momentum from the first to 
the second fermion, and thereby mediating the interaction.  The interaction-
mediating boson for the electromagnetic interactions is the familiar photon.  For the 
weak interaction, there are three, the W+, the W--, and the Z0.  And for the strong 
interaction there are eight interaction-mediating vector bosons called gluons. 
 
 Mass. Higgs.  Initially, all particles are thought to have zero mass.  But a 
‘flaw,’ an asymmetry, develops in the vacuum state and this flaw gives mass to all 
particles except the photon and gluons.  The flaw is usually thought to take the 
form of a particle, called the Higgs particle.  It is hoped that the existence of the 
Higgs will soon be experimentally confirmed.  
 
 The vacuum state.  What exists in ‘empty’ space, where the usual particle-
like wave functions are zero?  In modern physics, it is not just ‘nothing.’  Instead, it 
is a seething soup of particle-like wave functions going in and out of existence.  
The vacuum is thought of as a very dense state of fermions and interaction-carrying 
vector bosons with a ‘density’ of something like 3)( PL where mLP
3510  is 
Planck’s length.  The fermions are continuously creating and annihilating bosons 
and so, on the scale of the Planck length, the vacuum is not ‘smooth;’ there are 
vacuum fluctuations.  The Casimir effect, in which two very smooth plates are put 
close together, shows that the vacuum state can produce observable effects. 
 
 Quantum field theory (QFT).  Because particles can be created and 
destroyed (annihilated), the original, simple Schrödinger form of quantum 
mechanics, with a constant number of particles, becomes awkward.  Thus it is 
useful to recast the formulation of quantum mechanics in terms of operators (the 
‘field’ operators of quantum field theory) that create and annihilate particles.   
 Fermion operators ‘anti-commute’ while boson operators commute.  The 
anti-commutation of the fermion operators means that two electrons can never be in 
the same state in an atom, and two protons (or two neutrons) can never be in the 
same state in a nucleus.  In fact, the stability of matter depends critically on this 
anti-commutation property. 
 
 Strings, supersymmetry, more than three space dimensions.  Aside from 
interpretive questions, there are two major problems with quantum mechanics.  One 
is that many calculations give infinity (this problem can be circumvented but not 
eliminated) and the other is that it has proved extremely difficult to unify quantum 
mechanics and gravity.  These three concepts—strings, supersymmetry, and 7, 8 or 
more dimensions to space—are attempts to solve these two problems.  None of 
these three concepts is particularly relevant to the interpretive problem. 
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